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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of airpower in Counterinsurgency (COIN) in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The direct use of airpower is kinetic application to physically 
destroy the insurgents; indirect use involves support roles such as transportation, 
logistics, surveillance and reconnaissance. The former requires near-perfect intelligence 
and precision strikes to minimize unintended damage; the latter complements information 
warfare and supports ground mobility. This thesis focuses on how the direct application 
of airpower affects COIN in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA). Excessive use of sophisticated U.S. airpower and predator strikes has 
produced undesirable collateral damage, forcing exodus into FATA and complicating the 
regional situation. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) operates under operational, 
technological and cultural constraints. The use of drones in FATA by U.S. drones, 
conducted without adequate coordination, planning and political sensitivity, added to the 
trust deficit between crucial allies, making the use of airpower controversial and 
counterproductive. This thesis concludes that air power produced tactical gains but was 
strategically costly; it destroyed enemies, but also lost friends in the process. 
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The U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in the aftermath of 
9/11 attacks. Airpower played a key role in overthrowing the Taliban regime. The people 
of Afghanistan, especially in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, 
welcomed the change from the Taliban’s repressive rule. Many Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
fighters were killed. Some fled to mountainous regions in the east, some escaped to 
neighboring Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and many Taliban 
were allowed to go home and resume normal life after surrendering their weapons to the 
newly installed government. Many operations were launched in the following months to 
kill Al-Qaeda fighters and Taliban who escaped. By 2003, the security situation was 
considered to be under control.1 
The security environment in Afghanistan worsened in 20062 and has escalated 
into an insurgency. Increased numbers of U.S. and coalition troop causalities led to a 
debate among intellectuals and security experts about the causes of the deteriorating 
security situation. While generally blaming bad governance, unsatisfactory law and order 
situation, weak reconstruction and development efforts,3 and the availability of safe 
havens for insurgents in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), some 
authors consider the excessive use of airpower and resulting collateral damage as an 
important factor in the escalation. For instance, Thomas Johnson, an expert on 
Afghanistan, while pointing out that the collateral damage has adversely affected the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) effort, argues that “particularly problematic has been the 
careless use of U.S. air power.”4 Another author observes that “the ill-considered air 
                                                 
1 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5 (2007): 93. 
2 Mohammad Mosoom Stanekzai, “Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach 
Towards Peace and Reconciliation,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 212 (2008): 2. 
3 Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after Taliban (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2007). See William Maley, “Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (2008); available from 
www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22337&prog=zgp&proj=zsa. See also 
Thomas Johnson, 104. 
4 Johnson, “On the Edge,” 123. 
 2
strike raids by American and other NATO forces, which have killed and wounded 
countless innocent civilians, have been exploited for political gains by the Taliban.”5 
Similarly, it appears that the U.S. controlled drone attacks on the terrorist networks in 
FATA, providing support to the insurgents in Afghanistan, have claimed some military 
gains albeit at a significant political cost due to a high ratio of civilian casualties during 
the attacks. 
Insurgency in Afghanistan and rising militancy in Pakistan's FATA are connected 
yet distinct. They are connected because the insurgency in Afghanistan is the cause of 
militancy in FATA; and the militancy in FATA supports the insurgency in Afghanistan. 
There was no militancy in FATA before the U.S. led coalition invaded Afghanistan. For 
ethnic, cultural and geographic reasons the Afghan insurgents find refuge in FATA, 
return to fight foreign forces in Afghanistan and also find it easy to recruit new members 
to sustain their effort. The Afghan insurgency and the militancy in FATA are distinct 
because the insurgents face two different opposition forces. In Afghanistan, insurgents 
fight the U.S. led coalition forces, while FATA confronts Pakistan’s security forces. The 
insurgents in both areas enjoy fair support from the local people, but for different reasons. 
In Afghanistan, public support is primarily due to bad governance and probably 
resentment against the foreign presence. Support for FATA is due to ethnic and cultural 
factors. 
The counterinsurgent and counter-militant forces have a common interest in 
fighting rising radicalization in their societies, but they have different sensitivities and 
stakes that translate into different approaches to the application of kinetic force. The U.S. 
led coalition is fighting a “distant war,” with almost no fear of immediate backlash 
against their domestic populations. Pakistan’s security forces, on the other hand, are 
fighting a “local war,” with a fear of serious backlash against the local population. 6 The 
 
 
                                                 
5 Noureddine Jebnoun, “The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (October 2008); 
available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/10/the-denial-of-failure-in.php. 
6 Feroz Khan, a regional expert and professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
used the terms "distant war" and "local war" during a class for the course NS4663 at NPS. 
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U.S. led coalition forces are superior in almost every regard, especially in terms of 
airpower assets. This translates to a vastly superior fighting capability compared with 
Pakistan’s security forces. 
Politically, the application of kinetic force (especially airpower) in an insurgency 
or against militancy has always been a difficult task. Complex local dynamics make it 
even more demanding. This thesis analyzes the role of airpower for the operations against 
Afghan and FATA insurgents. Understanding why and how airpower has been employed 
in these conflicts helps show some of the mistakes made in the past, as well as suitable 
solutions. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Extensive literature is available on COIN, and most authors agree on the major 
issues in the field. This is not the case for use of airpower in COIN. The shorter history of 
airpower is probably one reason that the literature is limited, although the use of airpower 
in Afghanistan dates back to 1919, and much literature is available on airpower in the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition operations.  
A consensus seems to exist that “the population” is the common center of gravity 
for insurgents, as well as counterinsurgents. Analysts see insurgency and the COIN as a 
competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents to win the support of people.7 
Whoever wins the population, wins the conflict. According to Robert Jones, the job of the 
government is more difficult. The insurgents can be successful with verbal promises to 
the people. The government, however, must deliver on its promises to win the support of 
the people.8 A few authors have argued that good governance prevents insurgents from 
growing roots among the population. The legitimacy of the government increases if 
people see the insurgents as “bad guys.” People will support the COIN only if they are 
 
                                                 
7 Alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF 
Advisory and Assistance Mission (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006), 9. See also Major Lee K. 
Grubbs et al., “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?” Military Review (July 2005). 
8 Robert Jones, “Winning the Ideological Battle for the Support of the Populace,” Small Wars Journal 
(October 2008); available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/small-wars-journal-magazine-
tw-1/. 
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convinced that the counterinsurgents have the determination, the means and the will to 
eliminate the insurgents. Therefore, protecting people from insurgents may offer more 
dividends.9 
According to James S. Corum, “[T]he counterinsurgency effort should be geared 
to driving a wedge between population and the rebels.”10 Most writers seem to agree that 
a carefully planned comprehensive COIN strategy is required to separate the population 
from the rebels. A complete unity of effort must exist between the military and the state 
organs responsible for economic, social and political projects. A heavy-handed approach 
focused solely on the application of military force might prove counterproductive, 
especially if it results in significant collateral damage.11  
Most authors consider intelligence critically important for the planning and 
execution of COIN operations. Electronic intelligence may allow easy detection of the 
enemy in a conventional war. In an insurgency, however, finding the enemy is a serious 
issue, and electronic intelligence acquisition may not suffice. Highlighting the importance 
of human intelligence (HUMINT), Craig Coppock suggests that an effort should be made 
to catch insurgents alive instead of killing them in the operation. Eliot Cohen and 
Jonathan Morgenstein emphasize the need for knowledge about the culture, customs and 
tradition of the insurgents in order to correctly interpret the intelligence acquired.12 
Educating the masses as well as the armed forces also plays a significant role in 
the conduct of COIN. Effective psychological operations can convince the population 
that they will be better off helping the government. In conventional wars, hatred of the  
 
 
                                                 
9 Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperative, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 
(March 2006). 
10 James S. Corum, Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (Minnesota: Zenith 
Press, 2007), 27. 
11 Cohen et al., “Principles,” 3; Vick et al., Air Power, 30. Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland, 
“The Global Counter Insurgency: America’s New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm,” Small 




enemy may arouse courage among the troops. In contrast, in COIN operations, sympathy 
and kindness towards the population may help drive a wedge between the insurgents and 
the population.13 
Traditional air power theory suggests that airpower is not the ideal tool for COIN. 
The prominent theorists of pre-and post-World War II eras, Giulio Douhet, Hugh 
Trenchard and Billy Mitchel, hardly dealt with COIN.   These authors advocated massive 
airpower employment against population centers to break the will of the people.  Some 
preferred targeting industrial infrastructure, but did not pay attention to collateral 
damage. According to Sir John Cotesworth Slessor, Marshal of the British Royal Air 
Force and WWII strategist, a laborer killed in a factory can be as important as a soldier 
killed fighting on the front.14 These early theorists identified a few important 
characteristics of the airpower that can be useful for employment in COIN.  For instance, 
Douhet, an Italian airpower theorist of the post WWI era, highlighted that airpower 
operates in the third dimension, “unhampered by the geographic barriers.” Trenchard, 
known as the father of the Royal Air Force, argued that “nothing can be more annoying 
than to be attacked by a weapon which you have no means of hitting back at.”15  
After the Vietnam War, theorists wrote that airpower is not the ideal weapon for 
COIN, as it is difficult to completely avoid collateral damage that leads to serious 
political repercussions.16 
Beside these early thoughts, no real efforts were made to relate COIN to airpower 
until the 1980s. During next the two decades, authors such as Deryck Eller, Rod Paschall, 
Thomas Hammes, William Olson, Larry Cable and Dennis M. Drew studied the 
application of airpower to COIN. Most found airpower useful in supporting roles such as 
                                                 
13 Morgenstein and Vickland, “The Global Counter Insurgency.” 
14 Phillip S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II,” in 
The Path of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger (Alabama: Air 
University Press, 2001), 41-78. 
15 Phillip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory,” in The Path of Heaven: 
The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 1-
40; and “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II.” 
16 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars (Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2003), 270. 
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reconnaissance, transportation and logistic support. Highlighting the importance of 
secondary roles, Drew argues that these roles are “so important that to call them 
supporting is difficult.” In regards to airpower's strike role, most authors agree on the 
importance of limiting collateral damage to a bare minimum.17 
Airmen of the 1980s and early 1990s thought that the COIN operations did not 
require sophisticated high tech aircraft. High speed supersonic jets, flying at high 
altitudes, were considered unsuitable. Helicopters flying below 2000 feet were the 
preferred option, because they offered better observation of the scenario, more accurate 
weapons delivery and the flexibility to land in a variety of places. Surface to Air Missiles 
(SAMs), however, altered the situation, especially during Soviet operations in 
Afghanistan.18 The SAMs improved accuracy and mobility allowed engagement of low 
flying aircraft with a reasonably high degree of success, forcing the aircraft to fly at high 
altitudes outside the SAMs' range. The decreased accuracy of air launched weapons thus 
led to increased collateral damage, raising questions about the relevance of airpower for 
COIN. 
Technological advancements in airpower in the last couple of decades 
significantly impacts airpower utilization. Improved accuracy of guidance systems, 
increased endurance of the delivery platforms and reduced reaction times, along with 
improvements in command and control infrastructure, have increased the range of 
employment options for airpower. Recently, Richard Andre argues that with more 
accurate delivery, aircraft can fly at high altitudes and still deploy weapons accurately, 
thus reducing collateral damage. For this reason, Andre declares airpower is relevant for 
COIN. 19 
 
                                                 
17 Dennis M. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to 
Confusion,” in The Path of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger 
(Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 321-56. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Richard Andres, “The New Role of Air Strike in Small Wars,” Small Wars Journal (July, 2008); 
available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/the-new-role-of-air-strike-in/. 
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Afghanistan occupies an important location in Asia. Allama Iqbal, the famous 
Muslim poet of British India, called it “the heart of Asia;” Lord Curzon, a British Viceroy 
of India, called it “the cockpit of Asia.”20 Afghanistan has attracted many invaders. The 
British invaded frequently in the 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily to insure a 
favorable regime in Kabul and to extend trade towards west into Turkistan. The Soviets 
competed with the British to extend their influence in Afghanistan. In 1979, at the height 
of the Cold War, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, primarily to install a favorable regime. 
A U.S. led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy Al-Qaida and oust the 
Taliban regime. 
Afghanistan has a strong tribal culture. The state influence extends to peripheral 
areas through tribal leaders (maliks) or local warlords. The tribes have a history of 
changing allegiances based on material and political benefits.21 Mountstuart Elphinstone 
wrote in 1809,  
[T]he utmost disorders of the royal government never derange its 
operations, nor disturb the lives of the people. A number of organized and 
high spirited republics are ready to defend their rugged country against a 
tyrant and are able to defy the feeble efforts of a party in a civil war.22  
Due to the unique state-society relationship, most invaders faced little difficulty in 
reaching Kabul and installing puppet regimes; but almost all faced huge challenges from 
subsequent insurgencies waged by the tribes.23 
The history of airpower in Afghanistan by various invaders is relatively short. The 
British were the first to use airpower in the 1919 third Anglo-Afghan War. According to 
O’Ballance, “[The] RAF instilled fear into both the Afghan Army and the tribesmen and 
                                                 
20 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 7. 
21 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2006), 26; 
Rashid, 12; Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 10. According to Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles into a Hostile Land 1839 to the Present 
(London: Brassy’s, 2002), one reason for first Afghan war was the decline in British subsidies to Afghan 
tribes controlling the important trade routes from Peshawar to Kabul.  
22 Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, A Brief History of Afghanistan (New York: Facts on File, 
2007), 76. 
23 O’Ballance;Afghan Wars. See also Andrew Wenger, A Complex and Changing Dynamic: Afghan 
Responses to Foreign Intervention (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Center, 2006). 
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above all into Amir.”24 During the Soviet invasion of 1979-1989, airpower was employed 
in a support role during the early stages of the war. Mountainous terrain and the 
Mujahedeen’s guerilla tactics forced the Soviets to use airpower in combat roles as well. 
It proved effective until the Mujahedeen received Stinger SAMs from the U.S.25 
Airpower was used extensively in the U.S. led coalition invasion, and played a 
decisive role until Taliban regime was ousted. In follow-up operations against Al-Qaeda, 
the mountainous regions in eastern Afghanistan and intelligence gathering difficulties 
posed serious challenges to airpower.26 Various authors have criticized the use of 
airpower in subsequent COIN operations, however.  According to Cordesman and 
Wenger, airpower is proving counterproductive due to collateral damage.27 However, 
Cordesman considers technological developments and is optimistic about the future role 
of airpower for COIN in Afghanistan. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The thesis is organized in six chapters including the introduction, conclusion and 
an annex. Chapter II is dedicated to understanding the theory of COIN and airpower. The 
chapter argues that airpower, if appropriately employed, can play a positive role in COIN.  
The chapter explains the theory of insurgency and airpower, discussing also how 
airpower should be employed for COIN and what mistakes in the employment of 
airpower can prove counterproductive for COIN operations. 
There is a perception that the U.S. counterterrorism mindset is responsible for 
inappropriate employment of airpower in Afghanistan and FATA. Chapter III 
demonstrates that these perceptions are not completely correct. The entire hierarchy of 
the U.S. led coalition force had adequate theoretical knowledge about COIN and the 
importance of winning the support of the people. The chapter analyzes why the 
coalition’s direct use of airpower proved counterproductive for COIN in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
24 O’Ballance, 71. 
25 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 387-9; O'Ballance, Afghan Wars, 162. 
26 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Washington D.C.: Rand Corporation, 2005). 
27 Wenger, A Complex and Changing Dynamic. 
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The important finding of the chapter is that the evolution of direct use of airpower in 
Afghanistan, which is reactive rather than proactive, has been influenced by 
misperceptions of the capacity of airpower. 
Chapter IV analyzes the use of airpower in FATA. The direct use of airpower has 
been witnessed in FATA by local as well as external forces. Drone attacks, part of a 
dubious arrangement involving the U.S., have caused significant controversy between 
Pakistan and the U.S. Pakistan’s security forces have made extensive use of airpower. 
The aim of the chapter is to analyze the complete spectrum of air operations in the area 
and reveal how the U.S. employment of drone attacks has affected the Pakistan’s effort 
against militancy. Insufficient information about Pakistan’s operations makes a 
comprehensive examination of the use of airpower by the Pakistan’s security forces 
difficult. In addition to available open source material, the author's personal knowledge 
and observation is used to analyze the Pakistan’s use of airpower in FATA. 
Chapter V summarizes the important findings and offers recommendations for the 
application of airpower for COIN in Afghanistan and FATA. 
Afghanistan has experienced insurgency for significant part of its history, and the 
use of airpower is not new to the Afghani insurgents. Over the last two and a half 
centuries, the evolution of insurgency in Afghanistan has been affected by tribal, cultural 
and religious factors, external interferences and the internal dynamics of the state-society 
relationship. Why have tribal power struggles been transformed into “Islamic radicalism” 
in recent times? What is the role of external players? It may not be possible to draw 
accurate lessons from Afghanistan without considering the context of the current 
insurgency. Therefore, an annex to the thesis is dedicated to describing the evolution of 
insurgency in Afghanistan.  
 10
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II. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals briefly with the theory of insurgency and the theory of 
airpower. Effort is made to explain various level of insurgency, the key sensitivities of 
the belligerents involved, and the role that airpower can potentially play in a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. 
Recent experiences have raised questions about the role of airpower for COIN. 
How should airpower be employed for COIN, and what mistakes are counterproductive 
for COIN operations? In an insurgency the insurgent and the counterinsurgent compete 
for control of the population. People’s support is decisive for a victory. The insurgents 
and the counterinsurgents compete at two levels: political and military. At the political 
level, various methods are employed to win the support of the people.  At the military 
level, kinetic energy, i.e. ground and airpower, is discreetly applied to eliminate or coerce 
the insurgents to give up their demands. Because the insurgents often take refuge in the 
population, an excessive or inappropriate application of kinetic energy can cause losses to 
the population. The consequent political loss to the counterinsurgent can be decisive in 
the conflict. Therefore, the kinetic application, especially the airpower must be very 
careful in a COIN. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part briefly covers the theory of 
insurgency and airpower. The second part covers the role of airpower by examining 
counterinsurgency operations in Malaysia, Greece, Philippine and Vietnam. The last part 
briefly analyzes the methods used to separate the population from insurgents and the role 
of airpower in each of the four cases, followed by a conclusion. 
B. INSURGENCY 
The U.S. Joint Doctrine defines insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-
military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent 
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control.”28  Counterinsurgency is explained as “actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency.”29  Insurgency and COIN are included in a broad category of conflict called 
“irregular warfare.” The definitions, while fairly comprehensive, do not clearly identify 
the government that is the target of insurgency.30 Some authors have also termed such 
warfare as "small war."31 Small war is an exact translation of the Spanish word guerrilla, 
which originated with the Spanish resistance to Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Spain 
in 1807.32 Wray Johnson notes that most people use the term “guerrilla” to describe not a 
characteristic of war, but rather the type of tactics that employ small scale surprise 
engagements targeted at enemy’s vulnerable areas.33 According to the U.S. Marine Corps 
Manual, the small war as applied to the U.S. is defined as  
Operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is 
combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of 
another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory 
for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the 
foreign policy of our Nation.34 
This definition does not cover the entire spectrum of measures taken to fight the 
insurgents, but rather illustrates the anomaly highlighted earlier. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the terms “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” are used in the context of small 
wars in which the insurgents widely employ “guerrilla” tactics. 
Usually an insurgency is characterized by a violent political challenge to the writ 
of the state. The government reacts with a heavy hand to crush the challenge. As the 
competition advances, external actors may get involved on either side to advance their 
                                                 
28 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 (Washington, 
DC: 2006), 1-1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 7. 
32 Wray R. Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus Co. Ltd, 
2001), 13. 
33 Ibid. 
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Small War Manual: United States Marine Corps (Washington, DC: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1940); available from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/full.pdf. 
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own interests and provide financial, material, human, political and moral support to 
insurgents or the counterinsurgents. According to Wray Johnson, the insurgency literature 
offers three models of insurgency, the Leninist, Maoist, and Guevarist.  
The Leninist model explains an insurgency as a vanguard group of revolutionaries 
motivating the people to rise against a weak government that has lost its coercive power. 
The Maoist model describes people’s war as involving three phases. The first phase is the 
insurgent’s strategic defensive against the counterinsurgent’s strategic offensive. The 
insurgents develop their administrative infrastructure and “shadow government” by 
challenging the government’s authority through propaganda and terrorism. The main 
objective at this stage is to establish secure bases that can later be used to expand the 
insurgency. In the second phase of Mao’s people’s war, the insurgents launch 
counteroffensives to expand their activities and influence by directly challenging the 
government forces. In the third phase, the insurgents launch strategic offensives against 
counterinsurgents. During this phase, large scale conventional attacks are undertaken for 
a decisive victory. The third model, the Guevarist model, differs from the Leninist model 
in suggesting that a determined insurgent force with strong popular support can defeat the 
government forces even if the latter has superior coercion power.35 
Insurgents rarely have the strength to defeat the government forces in a 
conventional fight, especially during the early stages of the insurgency. Therefore, they 
resort to guerrilla tactics.36 Robert Taber offers an interesting comparison of guerrilla 
warfare to a flea in the following passage. 
The guerrilla fights the war of the flea. The flea bites, hops, and bites 
again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him. He does not seek to 
kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him and feed on him, to plague and 
bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and his 
morale. All of this requires time. Still more time is required to breed more 
                                                 
35 Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine, 28–30. 
36 James S. Corum, Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (Minnesota: Zenith 
Press, 2007), 13. 
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fleas. What starts the local infestation must become an epidemic, as one by 
one the areas of resistance link up, like spreading ink spots on a blotter.37  
Support of the people is the key to winning an insurgency. Considering the 
importance of popular support, most COIN theorists term the population as a common 
“center of gravity” for both insurgents and counterinsurgents.38 The foremost effort on 
the counterinsurgent’s part, therefore, should be to detach the people from the insurgents 
and attach them to counterinsurgent efforts. This key insight was proposed by Ralph 
Sanders in a three stage COIN plan for South Vietnam in 1962. The plan recommends 
that in the first stage, the people should be physically detached from the insurgents by 
transferring them to fortified villages. By providing good governance in the form of 
justice, job opportunities and improved social conditions the people should become 
attached to the government. During the second stage, the guerrillas should be targeted 
militarily and as many as possible killed or captured. During the third stage, an attempt 
should be made to convert the captured guerrillas into useful citizens.39 Most 
contemporary scholars and COIN experts seem to maintain similar ideas. 
In an insurgency, insurgents and counterinsurgents compete at two levels, military 
and political. Militarily, both attempt to undermine each other’s war making potential. 
Politically, they compete for legitimacy to win public support. According to Dennis M. 
Drew, for victory the counterinsurgents need to win both competitions, whereas the 
insurgents just need to win one.40 Militarily the counterinsurgents are invariably superior 
to insurgents, especially during the initial stages of the insurgency. Often the 
counterinsurgents attempt to militarily crush the insurgency through brute application of 
military force. Misdirected application of force due to inadequate knowledge, 
inappropriate interpretation of knowledge, or to salvage a bad situation for friendly forces 
                                                 
37 Robert Taber, Ear of the Flea: the Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (U.S.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 
49-50. 
38 United States Air Force, Irregular Warfare: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, (Washington D.C.: 
2007), 10. Also see Corum, Fighting the War on Terror, 27; and James S. Corum, “Airpower Thought in 
Continental Europe between the Wars,” in The Path of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited 
by Phillip S. Meilinger (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 173. 
39 Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine, 36-7. 
40 Drew, “Air Theory,” 324. 
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can lead to collateral damage.  Killing populations in and around the area of conflict can 
result in political backlash against the counterinsurgents. In this way, tactical victory at 
the military level can result in a strategic loss at the political level. Most theorists, 
therefore, agree that in COIN with the primary purpose of depriving insurgents from 
popular support, political competition should take precedence over military competition. 
Application of political, economic and social measures through good governance, backed 
by discreet application of military power, has often proved effective in separating the 
people from insurgents. An indiscriminate use of kinetic energy (K.E.)41 resulting in 
collateral damage can prove counterproductive to the COIN cause.42 
Another concern for the political dimension of the insurgency is the direct 
involvement of external forces. A society may accept foreigners as guests, but resist if the 
latter attempt to impose their own rules, customs or objectives. Local people may 
perceive foreigners as corrupting or disrespecting their way of life and often rebel against 
foreign influences. Local people’s tolerance varies according to the perceived actions of 
the internal and external counterinsurgents. Conversely, counterinsurgents often enjoy a 
greater margin of error as compared to foreign forces due to linguistic, ethnic or cultural 
ties. Anti-outsider sentiments are often used by insurgent leaders to organize rebellions 
against foreign elements or puppet regimes that are perceived as controlled by external 
actors.43 Most theorists agree that for effective COIN operations, domestic troops should 
take a lead role, and if foreigners are involved, they should be limited to planning, 
training and supervising operations. 
C. AIRPOWER 
For the purpose of this thesis, airpower is defined as all forms of aviation that can 
be used for COIN. It includes all the aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the 
various kinds of loads that they can carry for different roles in COIN. Airpower can be 
employed in a COIN in two ways: indirect and direct. The indirect employment supports 
                                                 
41 K.E. here means fire power, whether from ground or air. 
42 Corum, Fighting the War on Terror, 27-8. 
43 William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism and Guerrilla War, from the 
American Revolution to Iraq (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), xiii-xiv. 
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other elements to fight the insurgents or win over the population. Reconnaissance and 
surveillance can offer useful information about the location and movement of insurgents. 
In transport, airpower affords quick reaction to the ground forces against emerging 
threats from insurgents. Air logistics can support ground forces to sustain operations in 
isolated areas for extended period; it can also support the population and other agencies 
in execution of economic development. Psychological operations can be targeted on 
insurgents to generate divisions in their ranks. In a direct role, airpower is used to apply 
kinetic energy through close air support or independent air strikes against the insurgents. 
Enhanced range, endurance and accuracy resulting from technological advancements in 
the last two decades have substantially increased the lethality of airpower. 
Airpower has the unique ability to operate in a third dimension, which allows 
quick concentration of force at the most important place and appropriate time without 
confronting most of the adversary’s ground defenses. Early airpower theorists identified 
this ability of airpower to strike directly at the adversary’s centre of gravity (COG), and 
therefore advocated massive, decisive and independent employment of airpower. Giulio 
Douhet, for instance, recommends “neutralizing an enemy’s strategic ‘vital centre.’”44 
Hugh Trechard argues that airpower can “shatter the will of an enemy country” without 
destroying an entire generation.45 Similarly, William Mitchell says that attacking an 
enemy’s war-making capability and will to fight “would yield a victory that was quicker 
and cheaper than one obtained by surface forces.”46 It is interesting to note that these 
claims were made before the Second World War, when the inaccurate targeting due to 
technological constraints allowed only 20 percent of weapons to be within 1000 feet of 
the target.47 
                                                 
44 Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet,” 1. 
45 Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine,” 41. 
46 Mark A. Goldfelter, ed., “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William 
Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in The Path of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip 
S. Meilinger (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 78. 
47 Craig D. Wills, The Cadre Papers: Airpower, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare (Alabama: 
Air University Press, 2006), 9. 
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Airpower technology has made significant progress during the last six decades. 
The accuracy has improved exponentially. The GPS guided Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAMs) used in recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq are accurate 
within 10 to 15 feet even under complete overcast conditions or at night.48 The accuracy 
and high reliability of modern weapon systems allow discreet engagement of targets with 
a high degree of success provided the target can be correctly identified. Many have 
criticized airpower for lack of persistence. Low fuel consumption due to improved engine 
technology, air to air refueling and UAVs now allow significantly increased range and 
endurance. Increased endurance coupled with reliable and highly mobile communications 
provide a greater sense of security to the ground component of a counterinsurgency 
effort. Ground troops chasing insurgents into populated areas are increasingly inclined to 
go an extra mile for a hard-kill because they can rely on airpower if trapped in a 
dangerous situation. Technologically, airpower has the potential to salvage a variety of 
situations, but it often comes with a political cost due to associated collateral damage. 
Thus, some of the effects of technological progress on COIN, such as precision targeting 
and rapid response, cannot escape the serious limitations inherent in the political nature 
of COIN. 49 
The lethality of airpower has often forced insurgents to hide in populated areas.50 
It has drastically reduced the chances of military defeat for counterinsurgents because the 
insurgents are unable to concentrate and launch a decisive “strategic offensive”—Mao’s 
third phase. Such revolutionary tactics require the concentration of insurgent forces to 
win and hold ground, exposing them to direct application of airpower that may cause 
debilitating casualties. However, political gains may be nullified if airpower is identified 
as foreign or seen to represent external players. In this case, even a population that has 
been physically and ideologically separated from the insurgents may retain sympathy for 
indigenous rebels if victimized by of a foreign air assault. Recent airpower theorists, 
                                                 
48 Wills, The Cadre Papers, 10. 
49 Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, edited by Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 280. 
50 Adam J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era (Arlington: Rand Corporation, 
2006), 113. 
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therefore, consider indirect use of airpower such as transport, reconnaissance and 
surveillance more important and effective for COIN, especially when the insurgents are 
not physically separated from the population. In conventional warfare, direct use of 
airpower becomes more effective and the political consequences of collateral damage less 
damaging when battle lines and allegiances are clearly delineated.51 
D. THEORETICAL MODEL: APPLICATION OF AIRPOWER FOR COIN 
Based on theories of insurgency, COIN and airpower, this thesis proposes the 
following three step scheme for the effective application of airpower in COIN. 
 
 






Figure 1.   Application of Airpower for COIN 
 
1. Step 1: Separate Insurgents from Local Population 
Military power to coerce insurgents and good governance in the form of social 
reforms and economic development must be applied almost simultaneously. Indirect use 
of airpower for missions such as transportation, reconnaissance, surveillance, logistics 
and aerial drops can support the application of military power as well as the execution of 
projects for economic development. The primary aim at this stage is to separate the 
people from insurgents. Airpower in a direct role should be applied only if the 
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opportunity arises and with extreme caution against collateral damage. Insurgents are 
notoriously good at exploiting collateral damage to discredit and sabotage economic and 
social developments. Therefore, the military component of COIN, including all law 
enforcement aspects, must provide adequate protection to the civilian component.  
2. Step 2: Directed Application of Force 
This phase starts after the people have been successfully separated from the 
insurgents. The separation can be of two types, soft separation and hard separation. In 
soft separation, people are not afraid to work against the insurgent army, and may show 
increased willingness to spy on the insurgents. Increased Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
can translate into improved effectiveness of K.E., especially airpower. Hard separation 
occurs when the insurgents decide to move away from the people physically, allowing 
more liberal application of K.E. options. Airpower can be useful in many ways in this 
stage. It can provide support for economic development through indirect uses such as 
transportation and logistics, and can be used directly to provide security against 
insurgents' activities. Airpower can be called to respond to the HUMINT provided by soft 
separation, and it can play a decisive role by reacting strongly to hard separation.  
An important question is, what cautions in the application of airpower must be 
exercised at this stage? Hard separation offers greater freedom, and airpower can be 
applied with minimal political cost. Its effects on soft separation, however, can be risky. 
Political costs can be prohibitive if the wrong target is engaged. Before striking, all 
intelligence must be verified through multiple sources. The weapons used must 
correspond to the size, strength and importance of the target. The political cost-benefit 
analysis must be done before deciding to engage the target. 
3. Step 3: Sticks and Carrots for the Insurgents 
Increased military pressure, along with political measures such as dialog and 
amnesty offers, will encourage the insurgents to accept the writ of the state, which also 
has positive effects on the people. 
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E. SEPARATING THE PEOPLE FROM INSURGENCY: ALLOW 
APPLICATION OF K.E. 
Separating the population from insurgents is the key to successful COIN. 
Prospects for the application of K.E., especially through airpower have a direct 
relationship to the type and level of separation between the insurgents and the population. 
Three different levels of separation are discussed in the following paragraphs to explain 
the prospects for application of airpower. 
A scenario where the insurgents are physically separated from the population 
offers greater prospects for the application of K.E. It is easier for counterinsurgents to 
separate the population from insurgents socially in this situation primarily because the 
benefits of economic development can be directed towards the population and it is 
difficult for the insurgents to coerce the population. Social separation squeezes the 
insurgents for logistics such as food, shelter, weapons, fresh recruitments and 
information. Airpower can play a lead role in applying K.E. in such cases because there is 
no fear of collateral damage. Airpower can operate independently to kill insurgents and 
destroy their support infrastructure. Application of K.E. can force the insurgents to move 
into areas favorable for the operation of counterinsurgent ground forces. If the terrain or 
weather conditions are not conducive to application of airpower, the indirect application 
of airpower for transportation, logistics, reconnaissance and surveillance allows ground 
forces to operate in far flung areas for extended periods. 
In another scenario, insurgents are physically co-located with the population but 
do not command the support of the people. In this situation, insurgents may coerce the 
population for food, shelter, resources to sustain the insurgency and fresh recruits. 
Opportunities may arise to apply K.E. due to increased availability of accurate human 
intelligence. A careful approach, however, is necessary to avoid collateral damage that 
might lead to popular support for the insurgents. Ground forces should play a lead role in 
this situation. For independent application of K.E. by airpower, the people and insurgents 
should be physically separated, either by forcing the insurgents to move away from the 
population or by relocating the population. If physical separation is not possible, the 
direct application of air power will have to be coordinated and restricted. 
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The most demanding scenario from the counterinsurgent’s perspective is when the 
insurgents are neither physically nor socially separated from the population. This scenario 
offers the fewest prospects for the application of K.E. Until social separation is achieved, 
the role of airpower is best kept indirect. Application of K.E. without social separation 
will be counterproductive and self defeating.  
The following sections examine four case studies of COIN that highlight different 
types of separations between local populations and insurgents and their implications for 
the use of K.E. The cases are selected to explain different population-insurgent 
relationships. In the Malaysian insurgency, for instance, the people were physically 
separated from the insurgents. By contrast, in the Greek civil war, insurgents were 
physically located among the people but had little social support. In the Philippines, the 
insurgents were physically located within the population and also had significant social 
support. And the case of Vietnam demonstrates the dangers associated with the 
application of K.E. without social separation and highlights the critical role of the central 
government receiving foreign support for counterinsurgency.  
1. Physically Separated Insurgents: The British in Malaya 
The Malayan insurgency (1948–1960) offers a good example of an insurgent 
movement in which the people were physically separated from the insurgents. In Malaya, 
the insurgents chose to base themselves away from the main population centers. Despite 
support from a significant portion of the local Chinese community, the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) retreated into the jungles once the British reestablished their 
authority in late 1945. The MCP resurfaced in 1948, after the majority of population, 
including Malayans, rejected British rule.52 Operating from deep thick jungles, insurgents 
relied heavily on the support of populations at the fringes of the jungles. 
In order to physically separate the insurgents, the counterinsurgents relocated the 
populations. Subsequent social work, issuing of identification cards, and food rationing 
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helped to separate the insurgents socially from the population. Making the villagers 
responsible for the internal security of their villages through home guards programs 
helped generate a sense of participation and importance among the people.53  
The British strategy extended the insurgent’s supply lines. The insurgents' 
physical and social isolation from the population increased their vulnerability, which 
created opportunities for indirect and direct application of airpower. The insurgents had 
to travel long distances from their hideouts to get food from population, which made 
them vulnerable to security forces; it also offered greater opportunities to collect 
intelligence. With the help of transportation (para-drops) and logistics provided by 
airpower, the ground forces could patrol for insurgents deep in the jungles for extended 
periods, sometimes as much as 30 days. Food shortages forced the insurgents to clear 
forest land and cultivate food for survival. Aircraft were used to spray crop-killing 
chemicals to destroy the food grown by insurgents. Extensive air strikes were also carried 
out, probably because there was no fear of collateral damage.54 Despite reduced 
effectiveness due to thick jungle, airpower played a key role in breaking the will of the 
insurgents because they were effectively separated from the population. 
2. Socially Separated Insurgents: The Greek Civil War 
Another scenario is that the insurgents lack popular support and must rely on 
coercion for food and recruits, as was the case in the 1947–49 Greek civil war. The 
communist insurgents in Greece managed to organize as a result of the Italian and 
German invasions in World War II. They received external support from neighboring 
communist countries as well as Great Britain.55 After the German and Italian withdrawal, 
British and later U.S. forces moved in to defeat the communist insurgency.  
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Despite their physical control of significant area of the countryside, the insurgents 
lost the support of the masses after the German and Italian withdrawal. One reason they 
lost support was that people had become “tired, hungry, and desperate for peace.”56 
Many Greek ex-soldiers who joined the insurgents left to resume normal life.57 In order 
to isolate the insurgents physically from the population, the Greek government, under 
American guidance, introduced a “strategy of staggered expansion of control.”58 
Unnecessary patrols to eliminate insurgents were discontinued. Government forces would 
select an appropriate area and push the insurgents out of that area, securing the 
population against coercion. Airpower during this phase was mostly employed in indirect 
roles, including tactical reconnaissance, air observation, artillery spotting, aerial supplies 
and psychological operations.59 
In the meanwhile, the external support to insurgents also faded. In December 
1948, the insurgents made a wrong decision based on internal differences of opinion on 
strategy, progressing prematurely to the third stage of the Maoist model. The next phase, 
conventional fighting, was ideally suited for the direct application of airpower. Employed 
in roles such as close air support, armed reconnaissance and independent strikes, 
airpower accounted for more than half of the insurgents’ causalities, and played an 
important role in the final victory of the COIN.60  
There are differences of opinion on the importance of external support to the 
Greek civil war. According to Wray Johnson, the termination of external support to the 
insurgents was a “decisive factor” in the final outcome of conflict.61 Polk, however, 
considers the external support to insurgents as important, but not decisive.62 This author 
believes that eliminating external support to the insurgency is an important consideration 
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for COIN, but not the most important consideration. External support may not be 
significant if the population is effectively separated from the insurgents through good 
governance and the intelligent use of force. 
3. Well-supported Insurgents: The Philippine Insurgency 
A third case is when the insurgents have support of the population, socially as 
well as physically, as in Philippine insurgency of 1946 to 1956. Unnecessary use of 
military force in such a situation is counterproductive. A more effective strategy would 
first separate the insurgents from the people through good governance, and then apply 
military force with care. The example of the Philippine insurgency illustrates limited 
opportunities for direct application of airpower. 
The Philippine insurgency, referred to as a “communist rebellion”63 by some 
authors, began with socioeconomic grievances of peasants (taus) against their landlords 
(datus).64 The guerrillas' caring attitude toward the taus allowed them to win support and 
operate within populated areas.65 The insurgents' popularity was increased by the 
government’s initial heavy-handed approach, the poor state of its military forces, its bad 
treatment of the people and corruption in government institutions (especially the 
judiciary).66 
In 1950, “longstanding and legitimate grievances” were clearly identified as the 
root cause of insurgency by U.S. advisors, especially Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (later 
Major General) Edward Lansdale. Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippines' 
Secretary of Defense and later the President, devised a strategy to separate the people 
from insurgents. Use of military force was drastically reduced. Reforms were undertaken 
to improve the military's skills and motivation, reduce corruption among government 
officials and provide better economic opportunities to the people.67 Magsaysay’s style of 
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leadership and simple personality also played an important role. Despite threats, he would 
frequently travel to the countryside to motivate the government machinery and establish 
close contact with the people. An amnesty program offered by the government 
encouraged over 9,000 guerrillas out of 25,000 to surrender.68 
Meanwhile, from a sense of military superiority and probably also the pressure of 
declining popularity, the insurgents decided to progress to the third stage of Maoist 
model.  The government made another smart move by switching from large formations of 
ground forces to small unit operations. Public support for the insurgency, already eroded 
by the government's good social work, swung in favor of the government after the people 
saw improved military performance by the government forces. As Corum and Johnson 
observe,  
...noting how army units were besting the Huks at their own game and 
behaving themselves at the same time, Filipino peasants began to support 
the army and began to provide valuable intelligence on Huk whereabouts 
and movement.69 
The role of airpower in this case was mostly restricted to indirect applications 
such as transport, reconnaissance, psychological operations and aerial supplies to ground 
forces. Technological limitations and the small size of the Philippine Air Force are 
among the reasons for limited direct application if airpower, but the nature of COIN 
demanded indirect use of airpower in any event. 
4. Importance of Effective Government: The Case of Vietnam 
The role of the host government in separating the people from insurgents is 
critically important. Problems arise for external players in a COIN compound if the 
sovereign government fails to provide good governance. The application of airpower 
without a focused and coordinated effort to separate the people from insurgents is likely 
to prove counterproductive, as was the case in Vietnam. 
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General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow, designated by President Kennedy to 
evaluate the insurgency, called the South Vietnam government “corrupt and 
disintegrating.”70 Sensing the U.S. desire to replace him, Ngo Dinh Diem, the President 
of South Vietnam, cleverly eliminated the alternative candidates, and the U.S. was forced 
to support Diem. Polk considers the repressive rule by Diem a “virtual factory” for the 
insurgents.71 The self-defeating nature of Diem’s brutal rule is amply illustrated by the 
killing of about 50,000 people, most of them honest and competent officers, whose 
relatives and friends then became his enemies. 
Many attempts were made to apply important COIN lessons learned in Greece 
and Malaya, but all failed.  The idea of “strategic hamlets” was attempted to physically 
separate the people from insurgents.72 From 1957 to 1961, over 200,000 people were 
relocated. According to Polk, the exercise failed for cultural reasons.73 Another opinion 
about the failure of this strategy is that the local governments did not understand the 
concept or display sufficient commitment to it. The village sites were not carefully 
selected. No efforts, like issuing identity cards and security checks, were adopted to 
restrict the movement of insurgents in and out of villages. In 1967, the CIA launched the 
“Phoenix Program” to target the insurgents’ key leadership. The program led to the death, 
imprisonment or torture of thousands of people. It failed primarily due to corrupt 
administration, as the insurgents often managed to bribe jail officials.74 In late 1968, an 
attempt was made to replace the “large unit sweeps” with “small unit operations” with the 
help of local security forces. This also did not work, because by then the insurgents had 
progressed to the third stage of insurgency.75 
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Significant airpower assets were deployed in Vietnam, but the lack of 
coordination among the various security agencies involved in the COIN effort did not 
create appropriate opportunities for the application of airpower. According to General 
Andre Beaufre, who served in Vietnam from 1947 to 1954, because the Viet Cong did 
not present lucrative targets in the South, “it became necessary to take the air war to 
North Vietnam,” which led to unnecessary escalation of the insurgency and retaliatory 
reaction from the North Vietnam.76 Corum and Johnson note serious differences between 
the United States' Air Force and Army on the use of airpower. At one stage the two 
services engaged in unhealthy competition. In late 1963 and early 1964, the Air Force 
began pursuing independent goals rather than supporting the ground forces.77 Due to trust 
deficits between the American airmen and their hosts, the Americans took a more active 
role, exceeding their initial mandate to train and support the ground forces. The excessive 
use of direct airpower caused enormous loss to the COIN cause. 
5. Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 
The general population is widely regarded as a common center of gravity for 
insurgents and counterinsurgents.78 When the insurgents sense that they are losing 
popular support, they tend to make mistakes that create opportunities for the direct use of 
airpower and increased kinetic energy from the ground forces, as seen in the cases of 
Greece and Malaya. Similarly, when the counterinsurgents cannot separate the people 
from the insurgents, this often leads to disagreements within the ranks of the 
counterinsurgents that can be exploited by insurgents, as happened in Vietnam. Winning 
the population, therefore, becomes doubly important. It forces mistakes on the adversary, 
and also helps increase their susceptibility to error. Therefore, in a COIN, the political 
competition with insurgents to win people's hearts and minds and effectively separate 
them from the insurgents must have priority over the military competition. 
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Insurgents often use ideology or religion to win over the population. Popular 
support for insurgents or counterinsurgents, however, often depends on socioeconomic 
factors, as demonstrated by the cases of Greece and the Philippines. The use of 
ideological rhetoric by the government makes it difficult to trace the actual reasons for 
insurgency, as in the Philippines. It may even lead to wrong strategy, making it difficult 
to win the support of the people. The government should therefore focus on practical 
measure for socioeconomic development and delivering good governance, rather than 
competing with insurgents in propaganda.  
Insurgents with reasonable levels of popular support may not offer lucrative 
targets. A weak COIN strategy—one designed without understanding the true causes of 
insurgency or a poorly coordinated execution—will not generate opportunities for direct 
use of airpower. Frustration and poor coordination due to organizational competition 
among fractured COIN operations, as witnessed in Vietnam, may lead to inappropriate or 
excessive use of airpower causing collateral damage that is totally counterproductive to 
COIN effort. 
Notwithstanding the importance of good governance and socioeconomic measures 
by the government, a few military victories over insurgents can play a vital role in 
attaching the people to COIN forces and the government, as in the Philippines. Military 
victories convey the important message that the government has the capacity and the will 
to protect the people from insurgents' coercion. Therefore, opportunities to apply kinetic 
energy and win few tactical victories should not be wasted by adopting an overly careful 
and cautious approach. 
High-tech airpower, having demonstrated its potential in the last two decades, 
tends to generate a false sense of capability. However, airpower provides no shortcuts for 
COIN, even with improved accuracy. Recruiting may not pose a problem for insurgents 
after a few fighters are lost to air strikes, especially if the strikes produce collateral 
damage. A loss of key leaders, however, may prove a serious blow to insurgency. 
Targeting strategy in COIN should be designed for political benefits at the strategic level, 
rather than for tactical victories. Attacking people who are suspected of being ordinary 
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insurgents based in populated areas can prove self-defeating.79 The advantage gained 
from an aerial strike should be greater than the political loss to the host government and 
overall COIN effort.  
Intelligence is essential for all aspects of COIN operations. It is just as important 
for waging the political battle as it is for military operations. Success in political 
competition with insurgents aimed at driving a wedge of separation between them and the 
population also produces improvements in the quality and quantity of intelligence 
required for military competition. Careful use of airpower can support intelligence 
gathering, whereas indiscriminate use of K.E. can undermine the ability to collect vital 
information. Counterinsurgency, therefore, should keep in mind the tradeoffs between the 
short-term tactical benefits of airpower that may interfere with intelligence collection, 
and the careful strategic use of airpower that promotes intelligence gathering beneficial 
for both military and political objectives.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Airpower in a COIN is a double edged sword. Enhanced endurance, increased 
payloads and pin-point delivery accuracy give significant military advantage to the 
counterinsurgents over the insurgents. Inappropriate direct use of airpower resulting in 
civilian casualties, whether from bad intelligence or poor tactical decision making, can 
incur a high political cost. 
The theory of insurgency argues that in a COIN, the political competition with the 
insurgents must be given priority over military competition.  Indirect employment of 
airpower should be preferred until the insurgents are physically separated from the 
population. Once the insurgents are forced to move away from the population (Step 2 in 
the model described in this chapter), direct employment of airpower can be a strong 
weapon. Extreme restraint and patience must be exercised during Step 1 of the model.  
Impatience or frustration resulting in premature direct employment of airpower and 
collateral damage can lead to undesirable consequences for the counterinsurgents.  
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Good intelligence based on multiple sources of information can create 
opportunities for direct application during Step 1. If such an opportunity arises, the 
counterinsurgents should not shy away from direct use of airpower, because tactical 
military victories over insurgents help win popular support. However, the chances of 
civilian casualties must first be ruled out due to their high political cost. 
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III. AIRPOWER FOR COIN IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes why airpower in Afghanistan was employed as it was by 
the U.S.-led coalition forces. Coalition air operations in Afghanistan were similar to other 
recent U.S. operations, including the first Gulf war and Kosovo operations. In 
Afghanistan, although the Taliban air defense assets were meager, the initial thrust of 
coalition efforts focused on winning air supremacy. Ground operations by the Northern 
Alliance forces were preceded by the use of airpower to prepare the battlefield for ground 
forces, making it easy to defeat the Taliban.80 By 2003, it seemed that airpower was the 
coalition's key to winning the war. 
In mid 2006, when the insurgency in Afghanistan started to gain momentum, 
airpower was probably considered a potent option to suppress the insurgents. It was used 
extensively for both indirect employment and close air support, with mixed results. In 
direct employment at the tactical level it often rescued the ground forces from difficult 
situations. The civilian casualties, however, caused negative effects at the strategic level 
by pushing popular support toward the insurgents, proving counterproductive for COIN. 
This chapter attempts to demonstrate that the use of airpower was intentionally or 
unintentionally influenced by false perceptions about its capabilities. Because of 
constraints posed by the tactical compulsions and strategic losses, coupled with serious 
criticisms of collateral damage, the operations evolved into a reactive rather than 
proactive application of direct airpower. 
This chapter begins with a brief history of air operations employed by external 
forces against Afghanis, which clarifies why the insurgents in Afghanistan are proving 
resilient against the coalition air operations during the COIN stage of the conflict. The 
chapter reviews the coalition’s air operations in Afghanistan, which started with a 
conventional mindset focused on dislodging the Taliban from Kabul. The evolution of air 
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operations for COIN in Afghanistan is discussed next. The model presented in Chapter II 
is used to validate the COIN effort in Afghanistan. The last part of the chapter discusses 
some reasons air operations evolved as they have in Afghanistan. 
B. THE FIRST EXPERIENCE: 1919 WAR AGAINST BRITISH INDIA 
Afghans experienced the wrath of airpower for the first time in the 1919 war 
against British India. The Afghan army was reasonably strong thanks to Amir Abdur 
Rehman, known as “Iron Erim” for his heavy handed policies towards the Afghan tribes 
in the late 19th century. Taking advantage of the depleted military strength of the British 
Indian army because of World War I, Amir Amanullah declared independence81 on 
March 3, 1919.  Encouraged by the weak British response, the amir developed the notion 
of extending Afghanistan's frontiers southward to the port of Karachi and eastward to 
Peshawar and as far as the Indus River. Supported by local tribes in places such as 
Waziristan, he opened multiple fronts and posed a significant challenge to the British 
forces. 
After few months of fighting, the amir was overwhelmed and forced to sign an 
armistice in August 1919. Airpower played a significant role in curbing his expansionist 
ambitions. Afghans were unnerved by the British bomber aircraft that mainly targeted 
Afghan military camps. According to Edgar O’Ballance, “[T]he RAF [Royal Air Force] 
instilled fear into both the Afghan Army and the tribesmen, and above all into the 
Amir.”82 Afghans quickly gave up their expansionist ideas. However, the British ceded 
control of Afghan foreign policy, the main bone of contention, primarily because of 
weaknesses incurred by World War I. 
C. AIRPOWER REVISITS AFGHANS: SOVIET INVASION 1979-1989 
Afghans experienced airpower again during the Soviet invasion. The Soviets met 
a resilient and resolute adversary that displayed a positive learning curve as the operation 
progressed. The Soviets planned to occupy major bases, garrisons and population centers 
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in Afghanistan, using airpower, artillery and armor to keep communications lines open. 
Their tactics quickly evolved to include use of helicopters for quick reaction to insurgent 
operations, deployment of assault troops on short notice, flank protection for the 
movement of their own forces and attacks on retreating Mujahidin fighters.83 The Soviets 
deployed over 150 modern fighter-bomber aircraft to Afghanistan, along with numerous 
types of helicopter and transport aircraft,84 but they lacked precision guided munitions 
(PGMs) and relied on relatively inaccurate conventional guns and general purpose 
bombs. 
The Mujahidin lacked the ability to engage the Soviet aircraft in the air early on. 
However, they undertook ground assaults using rocket launchers on Soviet air bases with 
reasonable success. Sporadic use of SAM-7s, a heat-seeking surface-to-air missile of 
Russian origin, met little success because Soviet aircraft were equipped with flares to 
counter heat-seeking missiles.85 The provision of Stingers86 in 1986 made a decisive 
difference. The high kill probability of Stingers forced the Soviet fighter-bombers to 
operate from high altitudes, further degrading their targeting accuracy. Additionally, the 
use of Stinger missiles inflicted a loss of almost one Soviet aircraft per day on average.87 
During the early 1980s, the Soviets employed large scale air assault operations 
but failed to destroy Mujahidin strongholds, primarily due to rugged terrain. Bogged 
down in prolonged conflict, the frustrated Soviets resorted to a “ruthless program of 
bombing the rebels into submission.” Despite inflicting tens of thousands of casualties, 
they failed to shake the morale of the Mujahidin.88 
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With experience, the Mujahidin learned the skills to counter helicopters. They 
learned to identify Soviet helicopter landing sites in an operation and positioned well-
camouflaged fighters with machine guns and rocket launchers to target the helicopters 
during critical stages of landing and takeoff. They also learned to hide their logistic trails 
from airpower, and developed intricate systems to provide logistical support on mule 
back. By 1985, the Soviets determined that the war was unwinnable.89 Analysts believe 
that increasing loss of aircraft was a major factor in their decision to begin withdrawal in 
1987.90  
By the time the Soviets withdrew, the Afghans had destroyed the myth of 
airpower's invincibility.  The Afghans take pride in defeating a superpower with modern 
airpower that could not overcome local insurgents familiar with hostile terrain.  The 
legendary skills of the Afghan insurgents continue to confound current COIN operations.  
D. THE U.S. APPLICATION OF AIRPOWER IN AFGHANISTAN 
1. Conventional Use  
The coalitions’ initial preparations to invade Afghanistan, which began within 
few hours after the 9/11 attacks, relied heavily on the use of airpower. Twenty-seven 
countries were persuaded to allow over flight or landing rights for the U.S. air campaign. 
Permission to use Central Air Operation Command (CAOS), a key facility required to 
direct the air operations, was secured from Saudi Arabia and CAOS was on a war footing 
within a week. U.S. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) were activated on September 14, 
and U.S. tankers were ordered to fill fuel storage tanks at Diego Garcia and Spain for 
sustained air operations. Arrangements were made to enhance ammunition reserves, 
especially the air-to-ground precision guided munitions (PGMs). In addition to about 175 
aircraft already present in the region, approximately 100 aircraft, including fighters, 
bombers, tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance 
and Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARs) and other reconnaissance platforms were 
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deployed. Two additional U.S. Navy aircraft carriers joined the two already in the area 
for potential air operations. Significant efforts were made to insure deployment of 
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.91 
The operation into Afghanistan began with the indirect use of airpower in 
transport role, when the first U.S. team was airlifted to Afghanistan on a MI-17 helicopter 
from Pakistan. The mission of the team of CIA officials was to arrange for the insertion 
of Special Operation Force (SOF) teams that could direct air operations to support regular 
ground forces and to gather intelligence for subsequent air operations.92 
The kinetic application of airpower had a conventional focus at first, probably 
based on the 1991 Gulf War model.  Complete control of the air was achieved on the first 
night by 275 sorties that hit 31 targets. The Taliban’s meager air assets included 
approximately 50 fighter aircraft, most not airworthy for technical reasons, three SA-393 
batteries probably nonoperational due to lack of technical expertise, an integrated air 
defense system (IADS),94 an unknown quantity of SA-7s,95 and 300 to 500 anti-aircraft 
artillery guns (AAA).96 The SA-7s and AAAs were neutralized simply by restricting the 
minimum altitude to 15,000 feet for all coalition aircraft operating in Afghan air space. 
With meticulous battle damage assessments (BDA), and revisits over some targets, the 
Americans won air supremacy over Afghanistan within a few hours. 
The air effort was reduced by almost half on the second night, primarily due to 
non-availability of targets. The targets engaged included the Taliban headquarters 
facilities, troop concentration areas, Al-Qaeda training facilities and cave complexes, and 
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other sites with war making potential. The insertion of SOF teams97 after about two 
weeks of operations allowed engagement with Taliban forces deployed along the front 
line and other targets of opportunity. Within ten days of the air campaign, the Taliban 
foreign minister, Mullah Abdul Wakil Muttawakil, requested a pause in operations to 
persuade Mullah Omer to surrender Osama bin Laden.98 Any Taliban resistance to the 
Northern Alliance ground forces was significantly mitigated by coalition airpower as the 
later advanced to Mazar-i-Sharif and later to Kabul.  However, the feeling among Air 
Force leaders was different; they were of the view that the effort exceeded the 
requirement.99 
By late December, the U.S. Air Force had dropped over 12,000 bombs—mostly 
PGMs.100 Most of the Al-Qaeda fighters and hardcore Taliban element were pushed out 
of major population centers into the eastern mountains or adjacent Pakistani areas. Some 
Taliban were pardoned by Hamid Karzai’s forces in the south and melted into the local 
population after being disarmed. Despite extensive use of PGMs, significant collateral 
damage was observed, a fact that the Taliban learned to exploit for military advantage 
early in the campaign. During the third week of the campaign, Pakistan’s President 
Pervaiz Musharraf cautioned U.S. forces commander General Tommy Frank against 
mounting civilian causalities from aerial bombing.101 Similarly, there are indications that 
coalition ground forces were insensitive to some atrocities committed by the Northern 
Alliance forces early in the campaign.102 This suggests that at the tactical level, ground 
forces might have called for close air support without due consideration to civilian 
casualties. 
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2. The Insurgency and the Use of Airpower for COIN 
Primarily due to a repressive rule, people of Afghanistan were happy to see the 
back of Taliban.103 Fed up of prolonged fighting and destruction, the people, unlike past, 
reconciled with the presence of foreign forces in the country.104 Despite early chaos and 
looting in some of the bigger cities, the people had high hopes. They wanted security, 
justice, job opportunities, and return to normal life. Occasional insurgent activity and 
sporadic tribal feuds continued, and by the end of 2003 it appeared that the insurgency 
had died down. The expectations of the people, however, could not be met because of 
various reasons. Some of the reasons and their effects are discussed in the following 
paragraphs: 
Good governance is the key to counterinsurgency (COIN), and Karzai 
administration failed to provide good governance in Afghanistan. President Karzai was 
unable to curb local strongmen maintaining their own militias normally referred as 
“warlords.” In fact in some provinces he was blackmailed to handover the power to the 
warlords.105 According to a recently published CRS report Karzai has himself blamed the 
warlords as “…a major threat to Afghan stability”.106 Some of the warlords nominated as 
the governors of their province collect taxes and instead of depositing those to central 
government use the same money to raise personal militias.107 Their extra favors to their 
own tribe upset other regional tribes, which often leads to local feuds. Sometimes the 





                                                 
103 Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, 64. 
104 Wahab and Youngerman, A Brief History of Afghanistan, 242. 
105 Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, 76-9. 
106Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for 
Congress, Order Code RL 30588 (2008), 12. 
107 Wenger, A Complex and Changing Dynamic, 62-3. 
 38
Taliban or Al-Qaeda.108 In some areas the warlords were helped by the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).109 In southern and eastern areas even U.S. co-opted 
warlords to pursue counterterrorism goals.110 
  
Figure 2.   Economic Growth Rate in Afghanistan 
Significant reconstruction work was initiated after December 2001.  From 2002 to 
2008, the country registered an average economic growth rate of 14.4 percent (Figure 
2).111 
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Due to mounting corruption in the Karzai administration, the benefits of increased 
economic activity failed to reach the poor people. Injustice and corruption in the Afghan 
National Police caused popular unrest. External agencies and especially the U.S. led 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) pursued heavy-handed counterterrorism, often 
violating Afghan customs and traditions. Public resentment allowed the Pashtun-
dominated Taliban to begin their insurgency, resulting in increasing numbers of violent 
incidents as shown in the Figure 3.112    
 
Figure 3.   Security Situation in Afghanistan 
An upsurge in mid 2006 swiftly became an organized insurgency, mainly in 
Pashtun areas in the south and southeast, strongholds of the Taliban.113 Besides Al-
Qaeda’s foreign fighters, the Taliban have the support of the Haqqani network and 
Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. 
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Inadequate resources to provide security for the people and state machinery and 
the ongoing reconstruction works were other factors that allowed resurgence of the 
Taliban. The initial mandate of NATO led ISAF forces was limited to Kabul. The U.S. 
was always reluctant to commit ground forces in Afghanistan. The Iraq war in 2003 also 
took significant resources away from Afghanistan. Ground troops on routine 
counterterrorism patrols or providing security for ongoing reconstruction work often had 
to call airpower to meet the challenge posed by the insurgents. As a result, direct 
application of airpower increased rapidly, as shown in Figure 4.114 
 
Figure 4.   Direct Application of Airpower in Afghanistan 
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The sorties shown are only fixed wing Close Air Support (CAS). Almost 247 
sorties per day in 2005 indicate a high reliance on airpower to provide security for ground 
forces. The number of sorties almost doubled within two years.  In the same period, the 
number of bomb drops increased exponentially, from fewer than six to 119 bombs per 
day. The number of civilian casualties from air strikes also increased. During 2006, for 
instance, 116 civilians were killed in 13 airstrikes. Civilian casualties nearly tripled in 
2007, with 321 killed in 22 airstrikes. In late 2007, strategy shifted, minimizing airpower 
use and break contact with insurgents if airpower use seems likely to cause civilian 
casualties. Nonetheless, 119 civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes during the first half of 
2008.115  
3. Effects of Airpower on COIN 
Regardless of the number of casualties, the use of airpower is traumatic116 and 
might have significantly stronger psychological impacts than other forms of fire power.  
Figure 5 below shows results of an aerial bombing on an Afghan village. 
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Figure 5.   Aerial Bombing on an Afghan Village 
As a result, 44 percent of people in the south and south-east, areas more 
frequently targeted by airpower, believe that attacks against the coalition forces are 
justified, compared with only 15 percent in areas of low airpower activity. Afghan public 
opinion regarding the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the operations targeting Taliban 
is declining, as shown in the graphs in Figure 6. 117 
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Figure 6.   Afghan Views and Opinions on U.S. Presence and COIN Operations in 
Afghanistan 
The popularity of COIN forces has declined. The insurgents, however, have not 
gained much. Considering the momentum the insurgency gained in the last few months, it 
appears that increasing number of people are willing to help the Taliban directly or 
indirectly by joining the armed struggle against foreigners and the government security 
forces or providing critically-needed food, shelter and information to insurgents. 
4. Applying the COIN Model on Afghanistan 
Figure 7 depicts the COIN model explained in the previous chapter.  The 
appropriate objective at step 1 of any COIN effort is to separate the people from 
insurgents and attach them to the government. Good governance and the measured and 
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Figure 7.   COIN Model 
If the government fails to deliver good governance or mishandles the military, the 
people start to develop sympathy for the insurgents. There is strong evidence that 
widespread use airpower pushed the Afghans who were on the fence, as many as 70 
percent according to one estimate,118 towards insurgents, offering greater recruitment 
opportunities. For instance, Haji Khudai Nazar, a 33 year-old man who lost four family 
members and his shop to coalition bombing, stated, “By God, I will do nothing but to 
[sic]fight the government and foreign forces. Did we mandate [that] Karzai to [sic] give a 
free hand to foreign troops to bomb our houses and kill us?”119 Similarly, an Afghan 
farmer told Human Rights Watch that “People hoped the U.S. would come and release 
them from the violence of the Taliban but all the U.S. does is attack us.”120 The 
sentiments of Afghans in Southern Kandahar are reflected in the comment by Ghulab 
Shah, who lost nine neighbors to an airstrike, that “if this is all they are going to do for 
us, is kill us, they should get out.”121 Popular frustration can be gauged by the views of  
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Kandahar governor, who was expected to rally mass support for the counterinsurgents. 
He said that it is possible to replace the houses destroyed in air raids, but “who do we 
build a house for if they are all dead?”122  
Weak governance and widespread use of airpower resulting in civilian casualties 
are not the only factors pushing the people towards the insurgents. A major factor is that 
coalition ground forces are spread too thin to protect the people against the insurgents. 
Taliban roaming around unchallenged led to the popular perception that they could 
emerge as winners or at least force a favorable compromise; this discourages people from 
openly opposing the insurgents.123 
The application of the COIN model to Afghanistan is depicted in Figure 7.  In 
December 2001, the people rejected the Taliban and were willing to accept the presence 
of foreign troops.  
 
 
Desperate for peace, security, and job opportunities, they got bad governance by 
corrupt and repressive warlords. Application of military power did not respect local 
customs and cultural sensitivities. Direct application of airpower was ill-directed and 
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Figure 7: COIN Model Applied on Afghanistan 
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often used to salvage a bad situation for ground forces rather than for planned operations 
against the insurgents. People were coerced by the insurgents, and the government failed 
to protect them. As a result, significant numbers were detached from the government and 
cooperated with the insurgents. Airpower made a bad situation worse, and could not 
compensate for the other failures.  
5. Awareness of the Importance of Separating Insurgents from Local 
Populations 
There is evidence that the rift between the people and the insurgents was 
recognized at almost all levels of the COIN forces. The plan for coalition forces to 
operate in the Helmand river valley, one of the most restive areas in mid 2006, was to 
“work on winning the support of the people, bring in better governance and development 
and then spread out from there.”124 Similar understandings prevailed in almost all the 
coalition units. According to one report, British company commanders are authorized 
$5,000 for civilian victims and $10,000 for community assistance programs in order to 
gain popular support.125 The concern to win over the population is reflected in a NATO 
military official's comments that “we know we can beat the Taliban on the ground” but 
“the issue is the population.”126 The commander of international forces in southern 
Afghanistan from July 2006 to February 2007, Lt. Gen. David Richards, demonstrated a 
strong commitment to “win support among Afghan civilians by focusing primarily on 
economic development and avoiding combat.”127  
A similar mindset prevailed among U.S. forces responsible for most air 
operations. According to Col. Harry A. Foster, chief of the strategy division of the 
Combined Air and Space Operations Center in Southwest Asia (the command 
headquarters for the air war over Afghanistan), “To win the insurgency, we’re not going 
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125 Carlotta Gall, “British Criticize Air Attacks in Afghan Region,” New York Times, August 9, 2007, 
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to bomb our way out of this.”128 Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, commander of the U.S. 
naval forces in the region, maintained that “We don’t drop when we’re unsure.”129 
Notwithstanding this awareness, increasing civilian casualties from airstrikes adversely 
affected the coalition COIN effort. Mounting political pressure forced President Karzai to 
demand from coalition forces “more measured use of airpower to reduce civilian 
casualties from bomb and missile attacks.”130 To address the problem, Gen. David D. 
McKiernan, commander of ISAF and the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, issued a “revised 
tactical order” on September 2, 2008 addressing civilian casualties.131 U.S Defense 
Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered a permanent joint investigation group to efficiently 
investigate civilian casualties in Afghanistan. He also committed to apologize and 
compensate survivors even before the facts are established.132 Despite such across the 
board awareness, there was inappropriate and widespread use of airpower in Afghanistan 
for reasons discussed below.   
6. Exaggerated Sense of Confidence in the Effectiveness of Airpower: 
Explaining the Strategic Disconnect 
Within the first few weeks of coalition operations in Afghanistan, exaggerated 
claims about the capabilities of airpower that neglected to consider its effectiveness in 
urban COIN created significant misperceptions about airpower among ground forces. 
More accurate and high quantity precision guided munitions helped make the war, in the 
words of Central Command head General Tommy Franks, “the most accurate war ever 
fought in this nation’s history.”133 The successful use of 15,000 pound Daisy Cutters, 
                                                 
128 Elisabeth Bumiller, “From a Carrier, Another View of America’s Air War in Afghanistan,” New 
York Times, February 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/world/asia/24carrier.html?hp. 
129 Ibid. 
130 John F. Burns, “Karzai Offers Safe Passage to Taliban Leader if He Agrees to Talks,” New York 
Times, November 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/world/asia/17afghan.html. 
131 Thom Shanker, “NATO Tries to Reduce Afghan Casualties,” New York Times, September 16, 
2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/17/asia/17gates.php. 
132 Thom Shanker, “Gates tries to Ease Tension in Afghan Civilian Deaths,” New York Times, 
September 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/world/asia/18gates.html?ref=world. 
133 Eric Schmitt and James Dao, “A Nation Challenged: The Air Campaign; Use of Pinpoint Air 
Power Comes of Age in New War,” New York Times, December 24, 2001, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E7DC1431F937A15751C1A9679C8B63. 
 48
used for the first time in Afghanistan, was highlighted. It was reported that targets hidden 
among schools, hospitals and the civilian population could be engaged with minimal risk. 
The Pentagon claimed to have the images showing bomb impacts circling mosques and 
houses.134 It was reported in late November 2001 that of almost 4,000 Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAMs) employed, only three went off the target. The report that might be 
accurate statistically but can be misleading for the ground troops at tactical level without 
a technical understanding of airpower’s targeting methods.135 The potential of airpower 
to play a greater role in COIN was emphasized with claims about reaction times136 as low 
as 19 minutes, endurance of the platforms as high as 15 hours, the flexibility to change 
targets at any time and invent tactics on the job, and downplaying the need for planning 
and training.137 The few civilian casualties until late 2001, even fewer casualties among 
friendly troops and airpower’s ability to attack from safe distances were emphasized 
despite awareness that future tasks might become more complicated.138 The claim by a 
U.S. aircraft carrier senior officer that “we always had a precise aim point” in late 
December 2001139 may have been accurate then, but certainly does not reflect the 
complexity and importance of establishing an accurate aim point for the useful 
employment of airpower. 
One reason for such reporting of airpower’s capability is organizational bias. In 
order to get more credit for their success, airpower's advocates may have highlighted only 
its positive aspects. Given the strong impact made by airpower during the 1991 Gulf War 
and 1999 Kosovo operations, they probably could sell their argument. Some reports 
suggest that shaping opinion for the subsequent invasion of Iraq might also be a reason 
for the one dimensional interpretation of airpower in Afghanistan. Probably perceiving 
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the Iraqi's military capability as stronger than the Taliban's, U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell stated in late December 2001 that “they are so significantly different that you 
can’t take the Afghan model and apply it to Iraq.”140 
The early misperceptions and consequent exaggerated sense of confidence in the 
effectiveness of airpower led to serious malpractice in its application for COIN in 
Afghanistan. The coalition’s attempt to employ the so-called “ink-spot strategy”141 
displayed fatal flaws from the beginning. Availability of ground troops has been a serious 
constraint since 2001. With the coalition partners’ reluctance to commit troops, the 
numbers built gradually, to about 60,000 in late 2008. Altogether about 200,000 troops 
were available at the end of 2008, a number considered insufficient by most experts, 
especially when compared to the 700,000 needed in Iraq, a country smaller in size and 
population.142 Due to a false sense of the security and strength offered by airpower, 
coalition forces thinned out the ground forces prematurely rather than create secure zones 
first and then spread out.143 The ground patrols sent to secure the population often lacked 
numerical strength, armor and artillery, and had to call airpower to make up for 
insufficient firepower.144 
Reports suggest serious misperceptions about the capability of airpower exist 
among ground troops at tactical level. Illustrating an extreme misunderstanding of 
airpower capability, an American soldier called up a B-1 bomber aircraft to scan the area 
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for “military aged males with weapons,” a task completely beyond the capability of any 
aircraft.145 The need to plan an airstrike on ground was also not emphasized. Such 
misperceptions, coupled with the counterterrorism mindset and the comfort of having 
airpower in the vicinity, made ground troops on patrol unwilling to take unnecessary 
risks, especially during 2006 and 2007.  As a result, airpower has been often called to 
rescue ground troops unable to break the contact in a battle. Unplanned, hurried use of 
airpower to extract ground troops from the combat zone has led to collateral damage on 
numerous occasions.146  
In summary, air operations in Afghanistan were begun to first win air supremacy 
and then prepare the battlefield for ground forces. As the operations progressed to the 
COIN mode, there were misperceptions that originated in Iraq almost a decade earlier and 
were reinforced in the initial conventional phase in Afghanistan. In nearly seven years, 
air operations have evolved under dual constraints: first, the military need to salvage 
adverse situations for ground forces that could lead to significant friendly casualties if 
airpower proved inadequate; and second, the political demand to avoid collateral damage 
and civilian casualties.  
E. EVOLUTION OF AIRPOWER APPLICATION FOR COIN IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
The coalition’s indirect application of airpower in Afghanistan can be divided into 
two broad categories: support operations that include aerial logistics, transport and air-to-
air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Aerial 
logistics and transports are more expensive than ground or sea modes. They generally 
comprise a small portion of the overall effort, but provide significant advantage in hilly 
or mountainous terrain with limited infrastructure. As most strike aircraft operate from 
distant locations requiring several hours of transit time to target areas, the air-to-air 
refueling component is also vital to the high intensity of operations. Both fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing platforms have been used for support operations in Afghanistan. 
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Because COIN is intelligence intensive, ISR operations play an important role. 
These operations in Afghanistan use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), manned aircraft 
and space based systems. The data gathered by the sensors is used at various levels of 
operations. With data links, the data can be transmitted to remote command centers for 
operational planning. It can also be communicated among various aircraft and ground 
operators for tactical use. In the surveillance role, the Predator UAVs have reasonable 
success detecting insurgents planting (Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Sometimes 
the Predator can engage the insurgents with Hellfire missiles if cleared by the ground 
operator in the area.147 
The direct application of airpower in Afghanistan has been dominated by close air 
support (CAS), defined as “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile 
targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed 
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”148 In 
Afghanistan, coalition CAS is employed for various purposes. Analysis of daily airpower 
summaries for the past few months indicates that 40 to 60 CAS sorties are scheduled 
daily for aerial watch of route patrols and reconstruction works. The objective of these 
missions is to deter or disrupt hostile activity against reconstruction works; route patrols 
are flown along the ring road149 to discourage insurgent activities such as establishing 
illegal check posts and planting IEDs. Another frequently flown CAS mission provides 
cover for ground patrols in hostile areas. Ground patrols are equipped with 
communication systems to help the CAS aircraft engage the insurgents, sometimes also 
employing kinetic force. In emergencies, the aircraft on route patrols are diverted in 
support of ground patrols. To avoid collateral damage, kinetic force is exercised only 
when it becomes difficult or risky for the ground troops to break contact. On rare 
occasions, preplanned strikes are undertaken against fixed targets like insurgent 
compounds. 
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1. Show of Force 
Frequently, CAS is employed as show of force (SoF) under circumstances that 
risk high collateral damage risk due to civilians' close vicinity to the intended target. 
Show of force is also used as a tool to disperse crowds seen as a threat to security forces. 
To carry out SoF, the CAS aircraft are called to fly over the target area at low altitude, 
becoming visible to the naked eye. Sometimes they also dispense flares with dual 
purpose: first, to become more prominent; and second, to encourage obedience to security 
forces on ground by implying the use of kinetic force. Airpower summaries for recent 
months show that the frequency of SoF is significantly higher than the application of 
kinetic force.150 
Show of force is a soft measure to address the issue of civilian casualties. 
Probably no effort has been made to understand the psychological effects of SoF on the 
people of Afghanistan. Conventional wisdom suggests that the effects of SoF can be 
interpreted in two different ways. The critics of collateral damage with a “human rights” 
mindset and limited knowledge of Afghan culture may consider SoF useful because it 
helps reduce civilian casualties. However, given typical Pashtun personality traits, it can 
be argued that the effects of SoF are counterproductive. It is a fact that a Pashtun does not 
like anybody making a hostile gesture to him. Badal, a pillar of the Pashtun code of 
conduct (pashtunwali) that incites revenge, may inspire him to make a similar gesture. If 
made to feel helpless, an ordinary Pashtun is likely to revolt and may resort to violence.  
It is certainly unpleasant to see aircraft hovering overhead that might at any time 
devastate any local house.  The incremental fear and frustration this generates might push 
people toward the insurgents, which is counterproductive to COIN. 
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2. Unplanned Employment of CAS 
Airpower summaries suggest that most of the time the employment of CAS is 
unplanned.151 Considering that the aircraft have limited variety of weapons on board 
already fused to generate certain effects, it can be assumed that often the weapons 
delivered might not suit the requirement of the target. Additionally, because the CAS is 
often employed when ground forces end up in a difficult situation, the tactical operators 
invariably overreact and put in more than the required weapon loads. Many reports 
strongly associate collateral damage with unplanned employment of airpower. 152 One 
account suggests that “collateral damage has been almost exclusively the result of 
unplanned CAS.”153 Considering the way employment of airpower has evolved in 
Afghanistan, it seems logical that the unplanned CAS is an unintended consequence of 
the misperceptions generated during early weeks of the campaign. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The employment of airpower in Afghanistan evolved out of operating conditions 
and the implicit limitations of the force composition rather than a well conceived and 
planned strategy. It appears that the perceptions created about the effectiveness of 
airpower during the decade prior to 2001 significantly influenced the employment of 
airpower in Afghanistan. During the 1991 Gulf War, airpower emerged as a strong 
military tool to single-handedly overwhelm the adversary. An impression was generated 
that the technology not only allows winning the war quickly, with minimum casualties to 
friendly ground forces, but also limits civilian casualties. A similar though controversial 
notion was propagated after the 1999 Kosovo operations. There may be some truth in the 
perceptions generated with regards to conventional war. Almost no effort, however, was 
made to relate the technological progress of airpower to irregular warfare and small wars. 
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For reasons directly and indirectly related to the conflict, similar misperceptions 
were created in the early weeks of coalition operations in Afghanistan. A comfortable 
victory in Afghanistan was assumed in 2003. The importance of state-building was 
probably underestimated; an inadequate number of ground troops were committed for the 
challenging task of state-building. Misperceptions about the difficulty of the task, an 
exaggerated sense of security provided by airpower and ambitious plans led to thin 
deployment of ground troops. During 2004 and 2005, when relative peace prevailed and 
environment appeared suitable for state-building, the use of airpower did not progress 
from conventional to COIN employment. Continued emphasis on counterterrorism 
interfered with state-building, as collateral damage often annoyed the public.  Unable to 
take out their anger against airpower, they had no option but to target state-building 
activities. The strategy of using airpower rather than progressing to COIN in a controlled 
fashion evolved in a reactive manner. It appears that the mistake was realized early 
enough, but commitment of significant resources to the Iraq war removed the option of 
applying corrective measures in Afghanistan. 
Most analysts consider the application of airpower and consequent civilian 
casualties responsible for the failure of COIN in Afghanistan, and recommend ceasing or 
radically reducing the kinetic use of airpower. It is probably not recognized that the 
kinetic use of airpower in Afghanistan is reactive rather than proactive due to an 
insufficient number of ground troops. A one-dimensional approach, in the opinion of this 
author, is not advisable, and might lead to military disaster if used without eliminating the 
causes that force the counterproductive application of airpower in Afghanistan.  
One way to change the reactive use of airpower into a proactive use is to improve 
the density of ground troops in Afghanistan. An increase of a few thousand would 
certainly provide respite, although it may not bring a paradigm shift in the employment of 
airpower. Considering the number of troops that were deployed to Iraq, and the size, 
terrain and sentiment of the people in Afghanistan, it appears that the level of increase 
will have to be in the hundreds of thousands to create conditions on the ground that 
would permit the proactive use of airpower. If that many ground troops are not available,  
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another option is to apply the ink-spot strategy by negotiating peace at selective locations 
and concentrating elsewhere on achieving the density of ground troops necessary to 
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IV. THE USE OF AIRPOWER FOR COIN IN FATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The coalition operations in Afghanistan during late 2001 and early 2002 forced 
Al-Qaeda and their hosts, the extremist elements of Taliban, to take refuge in the eastern 
and southeastern mountainous region. The persistent application of airpower using 
15,000 pound daisy-cutter bombs pushed some into neighboring FATA in Pakistan. The 
militants easily found safe havens in FATA, having grown roots there during the war 
against the Soviet occupation. The militants adapted quickly to the area and contributed 
to the insurgency in Afghanistan. This led to a growing militancy in FATA and adjacent 
areas of Pakistan's North West Frontier province (NWFP). The militants reacted strongly 
to the government’s efforts to stop their activities across the Durand line in Afghanistan 
resulting in a near-insurgency in FATA. 
Pakistan’s armed forces moved into FATA in December 2001, and began military 
operations in early 2004 under intense U.S. pressure. Significant use of airpower was 
observed in direct and indirect roles. Pakistan’s operations in FATA have mixed results 
for reasons that include difficult operating conditions on the ground, national political 
and economic issues, and technical and operational constraints on the military tools 
available to the Pakistani forces. The U.S. pressure to “do more” has continued to mount, 
and the will of the Pakistani government to deal with the militancy is questioned in some 
quarters. Probably because of dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s efforts in FATA, in January 
2006 the U.S. began using Predator drones carrying Hellfire surface-to-air missiles. Over 
time, the gap widened between the U.S. demand to “do more” and Pakistan’s ability to 
deal with militancy in FATA. The use of drones escalated significantly in 2008 and 
continues to increase. This raises questions about constraints on Pakistan’s ability to deal 
with militancy in FATA and how kinetic application of airpower in FATA through U.S. 
drone attacks affects Pakistan’s COIN efforts. 
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This chapter analyzes the impact of military operations, especially air operations, 
in FATA and their implications for the COIN strategy in the region. A brief introduction 
outlines the demography and governance of FATA. The effects of Soviet and coalition 
invasions of Afghanistan on FATA are discussed. Pakistan’s military operations, 
including some constraints Pakistan faces in the fight against rising militancy, are 
discussed, as is the application of airpower and U.S. drone operations in FATA. The 
counterinsurgency model presented in Chapter II is applied to the FATA operation. The 
chapter concludes with the argument that intense U.S. pressure on Pakistan through 
various means, including drone attacks, impedes Pakistan’s ability to deal with militancy 
in FATA. 
B. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO FATA 
 
Figure 8.   FATA and North West Frontier Province of Pakistan 
The FATA is a narrow tract of land, 600 kilometers long and 130 kilometers at 
the widest, northwest of NWFP and east of Afghanistan. It is situated on the apex of three 
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of the world's highest mountain ranges. The FATA region is mostly semi-arid and 
mountainous, interspersed with a network of river valleys. Administratively, FATA is 
divided into seven political agencies and four tribal areas.154 
Pashtuns are the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan (and in the world).  Of 40 
million Pashtuns, approximately 62.5 percent live in Pakistan, including eight percent in 
FATA. The remainder live in Afghanistan, mostly in areas adjacent to Pakistan.155 
Ethnic, tribal, social and cultural relations between the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan mean that political disturbances in the former ripple across to Pakistan. In 
Pakistan, most Pashtuns are in NWFP, Baluchistan and FATA. Significant numbers have 
migrated to other provinces, mainly for economic reasons. About three million Pashtuns 
work in Karachi, the economic hub and the most populated city in Pakistan. Almost half 
of the 3.2 million FATA Pashtun are migrant laborers elsewhere in Pakistan.156 Any 
political disturbance in FATA is therefore bound to adversely affect wide areas and 
populations in Pakistan. 
1. Governance 
The FATA is loosely governed by the Pakistan federal government based on an 
agreement between Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah and FATA tribal elders in 
a governance model similar to British rule. The British treated FATA as a “buffer within 
the buffer,”157 controlling it through designated political agents and tribal elders. Since 
independence, Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies' jurisdiction is limited to the main 
arteries in the area. The administrative and judicial system in FATA hinges on the troika 
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of jirga, political agents and Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR).158 The FATA has never 
been treated by the government on a par with other areas of Pakistan, which has led to 
political and economic deprivation.159 
The people of FATA have limited participation in the national political process. 
There are 12 FATA members in the National Assembly and eight in the Senate. These 
members were elected by the tribal maliks until 1997, when universal franchise was 
introduced in FATA. Under the Pakistan Political Act, the Pakistan political parties are 
not allowed to operate in FATA.160 This allows religious extremist elements to grow 
roots in the area, especially in the last three decades. As a result of limited political stakes 
and the volatile law and order situation, economic activity in FATA is weak, as 
evidenced by the social indicators in Table 1.161   
 
Indicator Pakistan NWFP FATA 
Literacy (both sexes, %) 43.92 35.41 17.42 
Male literacy (%) 54.81 51.39 29.51 
Female literacy (%) 32.02 18.82 3.00 
Population per doctor 1,226 4,916 7,670 
Population per bed in health institutions 1,341 1,594 2,179 
Roads (per sq km) 0.26 0.13 0.17 
Table 1.   Comparative Social Indicators 
2. Effects of the Soviet Invasion on FATA 
The FATA gained international attention with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Western nations, the Muslim world and Pakistan collaborated to generate resistance to 
the Soviet invasion, and FATA provided an ideal launching pad for the Afghan jihad. 
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Jihadi organizations came from all over the Muslim world.162  The number of madaris163 
in Pakistan skyrocketed,164 many of them in FATA, primarily to recruit, indoctrinate, 
train and launch the Mujahidin for jihad against the Soviet invaders.  
The combined effort led to the disintegration of Soviet Union and significant 
changes for the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, 
the mass migration of Afghan refugees to FATA and the NWFP, and intermarriages 
among refugees and locals has changed the social structure and raised an ethno-
nationalist sentiment among Pashtuns. External threats, coupled with Wahabi and 
Deobandi madaris that subscribe to stronger interpretations of Islam, led to religious 
radicalization. The requirements of fighting against the Soviet threat allowed the free 
flow of weapons and opium across porous borders. As in Afghanistan, the tribal structure 
in FATA shifted away from maliks in favor of religious elements.165 The Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 but changes in the social structure continue. Events 
in Afghanistan during the 1990s, including fights between Mujahidin groups and the 
Taliban takeover of Kabul, still affect the people in FATA because of the jihadi 
infrastructure, the presence of Afghan refugees and the Pashtun ethno-nationalist 
sentiment. 
3. Effects of U.S. Led Coalition Operations on FATA 
The Northern Alliance ground offensive spearheaded by U.S. airpower 
overwhelmed the Taliban and supporting Al-Qaeda elements shortly after the 9/11 
attacks. While some moderate Taliban elements in the south integrated into local 
populations after surrendering their weapons, the extremist elements took refuge in the 
mountains. Air power was used extensively for counterterrorism missions, including 
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daisy-cutters. Difficult terrain, the porous border, insufficient ground troops and 
inadequate planning by the coalition and Northern Alliance allowed many extremists to 
flee into the FATA and other border areas of Pakistan. The Pakistan Army’s inability to 
check cross border movements was exacerbated when Pakistan redeployed significant 
numbers of troops to its eastern borders with India in the aftermath of the December 13, 
2001 attacks on the Indian parliament. 
The Afghan people were fed up with Taliban rule in 2001; this was not the case in 
FATA. The Pashtun adherence to the tradition of mailmestia166 offered refuge to the 
fleeing extremists, who brought with them intense anti-American sentiment. 
Geographically, culturally and politically, FATA provided a hospitable environment for 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to train and operate against coalition forces in Afghanistan. 
Since then, the spread of terrorism has affected Afghanistan and Pakistan equally. 
From January 2004 through September 2008, there were 14,353 victims of terrorist 
incidents in Afghanistan and nearly as many—13,434—in Pakistan.167 The U.S. has also 
paid a high human, economic, and political cost in Afghanistan operations. The newly 
elected Obama administration seems determined to achieve its objectives in 
Afghanistan.168 
Many experts consider Pakistan's support vital for achieving U.S. objectives in 
Afghanistan. According to political analyst Shuja Nawaz, “The United States cannot win 
the war in Afghanistan without the full and willing participation and support of Pakistan, 
its Army, and the general population.”169 Similarly, Daniel Markey, former U.S. State 
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Department policy planning staff member, considers Pakistan “an essential—perhaps 
even irreplaceable—link in the massive logistics chain for U.S. and NATO forces 
operations in Afghanistan.”170 
The U.S. and Pakistan have a shared interest in the fight against terrorism. The 
U.S. has emphasized coercive means rather than building confidence, cooperation and 
support. The Musharraf regime and the current regime in Islamabad provided complete 
support to coalition operations in Afghanistan, at a high political price. The masses 
increasingly criticize government policies, primarily due to continuing U.S. drone attacks 
in Pakistan, Pakistan’s military operations in FATA and the country's deteriorating 
security situation. In recent months especially, Pakistani intellectuals, politicians and 
media have demanded that the right of coalition forces to convey logistics supplies 
through Pakistan should be used as leverage to force a stop to drone attacks. 
The U.S. has frequently violated Pakistan's sovereignty to target terrorist 
networks in FATA, resulting in over 600 civilian casualties.171 In the U.S., there is a 
rising demand to attach economic support for Pakistan with progress in the war on terror. 
Peace deals between Pakistan and local tribes have come under strong criticism in 
Washington.172 Emphasizing the need to stabilize the democratic regime in Islamabad, 
U.S. officials have nonetheless made destabilizing statements, including Senator Dianne 
Feinstein’s claim that U.S. drones operate from Pakistani bases173 and the exaggerated 
assertion by David Kilcullen, General Petraeus's top advisor, that two-thirds of Pakistan 
is under terrorist control.174 
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C. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY OPERATION IN FATA 
Pakistan’s military operations in FATA commenced in December 2001, when the 
Frontier Corps (FC)175 was deployed in the Khyber, Kurram and South Waziristan 
Agencies based on information that Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements had sought refuge 
with local tribes. Local tribes were motivated by greed, fear and religious sympathies. By 
May 2002, it appeared that the paramilitary force was unable to check the inflow of 
Afghan militants. The Pakistan government deployed regular Pakistan Army troops into 
FATA for the first time in the nation's history.176 Operation Al-Mizan177 aimed to prevent 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration, to open up the no-go areas in FATA and establish the 
writ of the government, to preclude U.S. forces from entering Pakistani territory on the 
pretext of hot pursuit operations, and to establish complete writ of the state in FATA and 
absorb it into Pakistan's settled areas.178 The tribal people offered their complete support 
to the Pakistan Army and agreed to participate in operations against the foreign elements. 
However, they advanced three demands. First, they insisted that foreigners not be 
allowed to enter their areas, consistent with their history and culture. Second, they 
demanded that government forces not use aerial bombing, indicating the high value 
placed on airpower deterrence, perhaps in response to recent heavy use of direct airpower 
in eastern Afghanistan by the U.S. Finally, the tribes demanded that government forces 
not remain permanently in FATA, which appears to contradict one of the objectives of 
the operation.179  
A brief review of the initial operation carried out by the Pakistan Army suggests 
that all major tenets of COIN theory were given due importance. For instance, efforts 
were made to seek consensus with tribal elders through political work. Emphasis was put 
on socioeconomic projects to earn popular support, along with respect for local customs 
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and riwaj. As promised, no kinetic application of airpower was witnessed during this 
period. On the rugged, undeveloped terrain, Pakistan Army helicopters were used 
extensively in indirect roles such as transportation and logistics.180 For the first two 
years, operations were remarkably peaceful. It is claimed that the Pakistan Army 
established the writ of government in most FATA areas “without firing a single shot.”181  
By late 2003, it was clear that the local tribes could not keep militants out of their 
area and check their activities across the Durand line against the coalition forces. In early 
2004, Pakistan security forces started military operations in the southern FATA, 
employing heavy kinetic options, including airpower and artillery. In order to root out 
militants, especially the foreigners, the FC overstretched its reach into the rugged terrain 
of Kalosha in South Waziristan. This gave insurgents opportunities to ambush military 
convoys and trap military elements in the difficult hilly terrain. As in Afghanistan, direct 
application of airpower was used rescue ground forces. Tactically, the situation was 
salvaged, but at a significant strategic cost. Collateral damage, violation of promises and 
political backlash against a heavy handed operation escalated the security situation in 
FATA and adjacent areas. Numerous military operations by the FC, backed by the 
regular Pakistan Army, have been conducted in the area ever since. Poor communications 
infrastructure requires extensive use of indirect airpower for transportation and logistic 
support. Sporadic use of direct airpower with increasing intensity has also occurred.  In 
the last half of 2008, military operations began against increasing militant activities in 
Bajaur, FATA's northernmost agency. 
The direct use of airpower has expanded due to the deteriorating security situation 
and increased militancy. However, use of airpower is handicapped by high sensitivity to 
collateral damage, as well as technical and operational limits on the platforms available 
for the task. The Pakistan Army’s AH-1S Cobra gunship helicopters provide close air 
support on most occasions. The Army’s few helicopters are spread thinly over a vast area 
of operation. The helicopters' slow speed and limited endurance means a long reaction 
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time, precluding efficient employment of a platform at distant geographic locations. 
Reduced engine performance due to high elevation and fear of ground fire from militants 
on the peaks with medium to heavy caliber weapons limit employment options for the 
helicopters.182 The Army’s Cobra helicopters carry rockets and guns only for their 
assigned roles; they are effective only against soft targets such as personnel in open areas. 
Limited quantities of on-board ammunition also limit employment options. 
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) participates in the operations mostly in direct 
applications such as close air support and planned interdiction strikes using PGMs and 
general purpose weapons against militant hideouts. Open source data suggests a 
reasonably high degree of commitment by the PAF to operations against militants in the 
FATA. According to one observer, the PAF played a central role in the Bajaur 
operation.183 In 2007 and 2008, the Pakistan Air Force conducted 38 surgical strikes.184  
In August 2008 alone, the PAF F-16s flew 93 sorties in operations against the Taliban.185 
Pakistan faces multiple constraints on employing PAF assets for counterterrorism. These 
constraints are discussed in the following sections. 
1. Strategic Security Constraint 
The foremost constraint faced by Pakistan is a significant threat from India. 
Pakistan and India have a history of hostilities, having fought three wars since 1947. 
Indian intervention into East Pakistan in 1971 led to the breakup of Pakistan; this is a 
fresh memory for a considerable number of Pakistanis.  The two nations have also 
engaged in several low intensity conflicts over the years.  Especially since 9/11, the 
security situation has been prone to escalation. The Pakistan Air Force, although vastly 
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inferior to the Indian Air Force numerically as well as technologically, is Pakistan's first 
line of defense. It is responsible to counter any impending aerial threat from India, like 
the Indian violations of Pakistan airspace in December 2008.186 A handful of F-16s with 
PGM capability are the only potent option for close air support to the Pakistan security 
forces operations in FATA. These F-16s also provide a major share of the air defense 
efforts all over the country against threats from the east. Resource constraint PAF has a 
very limited trans-frontier radar coverage, which means limited early warning of 
emerging threats. It requires a high state of operational readiness for air defense duties, 
tying down significant assets to protect Pakistan’s strategic targets against threats from 
the east. 
2. Tactical Constraints Due to Lack of Technology 
Although used extensively,187 the aircrafts' technical limitations require cautious 
employment of the aging F-16 fleet to support the Pakistan Army’s operations against 
militancy. Planning and execution of PAF operations are significantly handicapped by a 
lack of real time electronic intelligence and inferior technical means for command, 
control and communications. All close air support sorties must be pre-planned, with 
limited room for adjustment to the changing ground scenario after launch. This 
compromises the optimal employment of force. Inadequate communications and limited 
coordination with the friendly ground forces restricts ground force movement during air 
activity in order to prevent fratricide.  Unlike coalition forces, the PAF has only LASER 
guided PGMs whose operation is frequently limited by clouds and reduced visibility from 
fog or dust in suspension. The targeting pods used by the PAF to deliver these PGMs lack 
night capability.188 The airpower tools available to Pakistan for kinetic applications have 
a fair capability to target militants trapped in known locations, but are significantly 
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constrained by time and weather conditions. These limitations are well understood and 
often exploited by the militants. Therefore, airpower lacks the tactical deterrence to 
impede the militants’ freedom of movement. Provision of GPS guided JDAMs that can 
be employed around the clock in all weather conditions, along with better command, 
control and communication means for better coordination with friendly ground forces, 
would help address some of these problems. 
3. Trust Deficit 
Notwithstanding the troubled history of U.S.-Pakistan relations,189 the PAF has 
always relied heavily on the U.S. to meet its high-tech weapons requirements including 
platforms and precision guided munitions. Despite sanctions and cancelled deals in the 
past, Pakistan signed another deal with the U.S. in June 2005 for procurement of more F-
16s and associated weapons. The post Cold War scenario in South Asia has caused a 
significant shift of U.S. policy in favor of India. Many U.S. analysts and think tanks 
support stronger U.S. relations with India as compared to Pakistan. Christine Fair, a 
RAND political analyst, refers to Pakistan as "an uncertain partner in the fight against 
terrorism,” while calling India "a long-term partner in counterterrorism.”190 There are 
fears that the weapons procured by Pakistan from the U.S. will be used against India, 
raising questions about the future of the deal. These perceptions have two important 
implications for Pakistan’s COIN effort in FATA and the employment of airpower in this 
effort. First, anticipating problems with the delivery of weapons in the 2005 deal, the 
PAF might conserve the use of high-tech weapons in order to maintain a reasonable 
degree of viability against India, adversely affecting counterterrorism operations. Second, 
such perceptions lead to the notion that the U.S. wants Pakistan to be subservient to India, 
which the people of Pakistan may find unacceptable at any cost. Diminishing public 
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support due to the perception that the war on terrorism is a U.S.-Indian conspiracy against 
Pakistan and the Muslim world makes it difficult for Pakistan's government to 
aggressively target the growing militancy in FATA. 
There is a significant trust deficit regarding Pakistan’s sincere allegiance to the 
war on terrorism. It is believed in Washington that elements in Pakistan’s intelligence 
agencies maintain links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban first established during the Soviet 
invasion. The U.S. senior military leadership recently criticized Pakistan, demanding an 
end to such ties.191 Some people argue that the Pakistan security agencies tip off the 
militants with vital information, adversely affecting operations. Such perceptions have 
tactical as well as strategic effects for COIN in FATA. At tactical levels, mistrust limits 
the exchange of intelligence information and coordination between the two forces. At the 
strategic level, mistrust makes it more difficult for the Pakistan government to separate 
the people from insurgents. 
It appears that Pakistan military operations have caused serious damage to the 
organizational structure of Al-Qaeda.192 While far from being destroyed, Al-Qaeda can 
no longer operate freely in FATA. Taliban elements also received significant punishment.  
However, they managed a resurgence primarily due to a military operation in 2007 
against militants in Lal Masjid.193 The militants in FATA strongly opposed the operation 
and vowed revenge.194 Other reasons for the Taliban’s resurgence include the weakness 
of President Musharraf's government, growing anti-American sentiment throughout 
Pakistan and the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the country. A significant 
portion of the Pakistani public believe that Musharraf adopted a heavy handed application 
of force on American dictates in order to secure his rule, compromising the internal 
security. The U.S. drone attacks in FATA, especially in 2008, played an important role in 
developing such perceptions. 
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D. THE U.S. DRONE OPERATIONS IN FATA 
The first U.S. attack in FATA was carried out on January 13, 2006, in Bajaur. It 
killed 18 people.  Ayman-al-Zawahiri, a senior Al-Qaeda leader, was reportedly the 
target;195 however, he left the target site shortly before the attack. Al-Qaeda leader Abdur 
Rehman Al-Maghribi, a Moroccan said to be the Chief of Al-Qaeda operations in 
Pakistan, was purportedly killed.196 In addition to targeting Ayman-al-Zawahiri and other 
senior Al-Qaeda leadership, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan during 
2005 is a possible reason for the attack.  See Figure 9. 
  
 
Figure 9.   Security incidents in Afghanistan197 
Additionally, it appeared that Al-Qaeda was re-establishing its Soviet-era foothold in 
FATA. An air attack was probably preferred over a ground operation for a variety of 
reasons:  the difficult terrain, the inhospitable environment and Pakistan's political 
sensitivities. In addition, Predator UAV and Hellfire air-to-surface missiles have long 
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endurance and pose no risk to their operators’ lives.198 It is also believed that intelligence 
sharing between Pakistan and the U.S. led to this attack, and the attack was officially 
owned by the Musharraf government.199 
The next drone attacks were in April and June 2007 in North Waziristan. The 
reported targets included senior Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership and their joint training 
infrastructure. The attacks killed between 35 and 49 people, mostly innocent civilians, 
and no high value targets (HVT).200 In 2008 drone attacks escalated. Twelve attacks in 
the first eight months killed 155 people, among them only two HVTs.  The vast majority 
of those killed were again civilians, including women and children.201 In the last four 
months of 2008, after Musharraf was forced to resign, the number of attacks increased 
rapidly. Twenty-five attacks were carried out.  One in the settled area of Bannu killed 282 
people, mostly innocent civilians, including women and children. In the first quarter of 
2009, 12 more attacks killed more than 145 people, including two HVTs. Recent reports 
quote Obama administration officials suggesting that the U.S. plans talks with the 
Taliban.  But to negotiate from a position of strength, the U.S. will probably increase the 
level of attacks first. According to a Western diplomat, “There will be talks but the 
Taliban are going to experience a lot of pain first, on both sides of the border.”202 
1. Pakistan’s Official Response to Drone Attacks 
Pakistan’s official response is ambiguous about its consent for the drone attacks. 
It is believed that for the first attack in January 2006, there was some intelligence sharing 
between Pakistan and the U.S., and the attack was officially owned by the Musharraf  
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government in Pakistan.203 The response of Musharraf regime to subsequent attacks in 
2007 and especially the first eight months of 2008 was generally muted, probably due to 
increasing domestic political pressure. 
The current regime in Islamabad is more vocal in opposing the drone attacks, and 
frequently protesting the civilian casualties. The issue, however, continues to be 
confusing for public perceptions. Some reports in late 2008 suggested that there was a 
secret deal between the government of Pakistan and the U.S. to allow the September 
drone attacks in FATA. Pakistan’s foreign office spokesman strongly denied the 
report.204 Pakistan President Asif Zardari also disapproved of the attack; however, he 
appeared willing to give American forces the benefit of doubt in light of the ill-defined 
border.205 This is a questionable stance because a significant number of missile strikes 
were fairly deep inside Pakistani territory.206 Many analysts view the Pakistan 
government’s stance on the drone attacks with great suspicion. For instance, Riffat 
Hussain, head of the Strategic Studies Department at Quaid-e-Azam University in 
Islamabad, thinks, “Pakistan government’s stated opposition to drone attacks is only 
rhetorical and it does not mean much in practical terms.”207 
2. The Public Perceptions of Drone Attacks 
The drone attacks cause significant anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. 
Especially in FATA, it appears that the drone attacks have added a new dimension to the 
militancy. Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban, said in an 
interview, “I spent three months trying to recruit and only got 10-15 persons. One U.S. 
attack and I got 150 volunteers.”208 The statement indicates that Mehsud had a cause 
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even prior to the beginning of the drone attacks, but probably was struggling with the 
recruitments. Claiming responsibility for the March 30, 2009 terrorist attack on a police 
training center in Lahore, Mehsud says, “[T]he attack was in retaliation for the U.S. drone 
strikes in the tribal areas.”209 The statement clearly indicates that Mehsud is trying to ride 
the wave of local public sentiment to generate more recruitment for militancy and to gain 
popular support in FATA as well as Pakistan.   
An alternate view is that Pakistan’s Taliban have limited support in FATA, but 
could effectively coerce the people into submission due to the government of Pakistan’s 
limited writ in FATA. There are reports from affected areas that drone attacks are 
welcomed by segments of population who do not want to live under Taliban rule. 
According to journalists who interviewed local people in drone affected areas, before the 
increased frequency of drone attacks, Taliban militants used to force the locals to give 
them shelter. Now they have stopped harassing people for fear that their presence might 
be disclosed. According to Riffat Hussain, “Drones are the most dreaded thing in FATA 
as there is no escape from them.”210 
According to polls conducted in October 2008, 32 percent of people in Pakistan 
think that the Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terrorism has mostly 
benefitted the U.S., as against only two percent who thinks that it has favored Pakistan. 
From June to October 2008, those who think that cooperation has benefitted neither the 
U.S. nor Pakistan has doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent.211 According to Gallup 
polls in Pakistan during the same time frame, almost half of the Pakistani population sees 
the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan.212 Along with declining 
public support for the U.S.-Pakistan coalition, the government faces intense criticism by 
all segments of society, especially in recent months. Strong criticism has raised the 
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political cost of government collaboration with the U.S. For instance, defense analyst 
Shireen Mazari maintains that “When the Pakistani state allows its territory to be used for 
drones that kill Pakistanis –and it is irrelevant whether they are killed deliberately or as 
‘collateral damage’–more space is created for future recruits who want to fight the U.S. 
and its collaborators.”213 Similarly, most political leaders advocate that the government 
abandon “the U.S. policy for the ‘so-called’ war on terror and devise its own.”214  
3. Analysis of the U.S. Drone Attacks  
 
Figure 10.   Victims of Security Incidents in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
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Since the insurgency in Afghanistan picked up its pace in mid 2006, the security 
situation in Pakistan has deteriorated significantly, as shown in Figure 10.215 Senior 
leadership in Washington regularly point out the “safe havens” in FATA, fuelling the  
insurgency in Afghanistan. Political leadership in Pakistan, in contrast, sees the security 
situation and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as the cause of increasing radicalization 
and the continually deteriorating security situation.216   
Statistically, Pakistan has suffered more than Afghanistan, especially in recent 
months.217 Besides civilian casualties, the armed forces of Pakistan lost more troops to 
terrorism than the coalition forces in Afghanistan. The political leadership in Pakistan 
emphasizes that for the situation to normalize in FATA and Pakistan, there must be a 
reasonable level of peace in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding conflicting regional interests, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the U.S. and other coalition partners in Afghanistan have a 
common interest in fighting terrorism. Conflicting regional interests among coalition 
partners seem to outweigh common interests. Criticism of Pakistan’s COIN effort and 
security forces by senior military and civilian leadership and officials in Washington 
directly and indirectly benefits the insurgents. Directly, such criticism generates hope 
among insurgents and allows them to convince the local population that they are winning 
the war and will force the government forces to leave the area soon. Indirectly, it 
increases anti-U.S. sentiment in settled areas, as people swing support away from the 
COIN and, in limited cases, in favor of the insurgents. 
The statistics shown in the Figure 11 indicate a link between drone attacks and the 
security situation in Pakistan. With the increase in drone attacks, the number of security 
incidents also increases, especially in for the first nine months of 2008.218 
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Figure 11.   Number of victims of drone attacks and security incidents in Pakistan 
Despite favorable sentiment by part of the FATA population, it appears that the 
gains made by the drone attacks are outweighed by the cost. So far the 55 attacks that 
have killed about 650 people have only claimed 11 HVTs.219 It is claimed that numerous 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants have been killed; but replacements for these militants are 
readily available. It is claimed that the attacks seriously degrade Al-Qaeda’s ability to 
plan and undertake major operations against the U.S. and the West. This might be true of 
Al-Qaeda's capacity to undertake such attacks. However, increasing radicalization, in 
terms of numbers as well as intensity, is evident from the rise of security incidents in the 
region. It appears that the drone attacks have increased militants’ motivation for terrorist 
activity. Public opinion in settled areas of Pakistan does not ideologically favor the 
insurgents; growing anti-American sentiment, however, seems to be a dominant factor.  
E. APPLYING THE COIN MODEL TO FATA 
Popular support is critical for the insurgents. Therefore the government must 
detach the people from the insurgents and attach them to the government, which requires 
 
                                                 
















good governance, economic development and a very well directed and calibrated 
application of military power. The model as applied to the COIN effort in FATA is 
depicted in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.   COIN Effort in FATA 
Unlike in Afghanistan, at first the insurgents enjoyed fair support in FATA for 
historic, religious and cultural reasons. However, the Pakistani security forces’ peaceful 
presence in the area for the first few years and support from local tribes against foreign 
elements suggest that the population was divided over the issue. Government promises 
made to local people had to be broken in order to root out militants from the difficult 
mountainous terrain. Kinetic application of airpower was resorted to, with mixed results. 
Serious damage has been done to the Al-Qaeda network, but it is far from being 
completely destroyed. Although the Taliban managed a resurgence in Pakistan, they do 
not enjoy widespread popular support. Overall, it appears that the sentiment of the people 
in FATA and in Afghanistan is somewhat similar.  Neither favor the insurgents, who are 
coercive and advocate an unpopular interpretation of Islam.  Nor do they favor the 
counterinsurgents, because of broken promises, poor socioeconomic conditions and anti-
American sentiment. 
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Despite limited local support for the insurgents, Pakistan’s COIN has been unable 
to deliver a decisive blow. Part of the problem is that Pakistan does not have the 
economic strength to back up military operations with rapid economic development.  
This is evident in Bajaur agency, where the Pakistani forces gained a significant military 
victory, but development works are off mark due to nationwide economic difficulties.220 
Also, Pakistan security forces are not adequately equipped and trained for the task at 
hand. Technological inadequacies impose serious constraints for the direct application of 
airpower. Fearing political backlash from collateral damage, the government of Pakistan 
has probably been cautious in applying military power, and especially airpower. 
Increasing drone attacks by the U.S. have been partially successful in counterterrorism, 
but as a major cause of growing anti-American sentiment, the attacks impede Pakistani 
forces’ ability to deal with the militancy.  
F. CONCLUSION 
According to the theory of insurgency described in Chapter II, for a successful 
COIN the political competition with insurgents must take precedence over military 
competition. Pakistan’s security forces did a poor job by initiating direct use of airpower, 
contrary to earlier promises, and not confiding in the local people.  This was a reactionary 
move rather than a well thought out plan. Nevertheless, as suggested by the theory, it 
proved counterproductive and increased militancy in FATA. Because of cultural and 
ethnic links all over Pakistan and especially across the Durand line and in adjacent areas 
of NWFP, the phenomena expanded in both the directions. The security situation over 
most of Pakistan deteriorated, apparently linked to the level of violence in FATA.  
Increased militancy has progressed to a near insurgency in FATA. 
Notwithstanding the deteriorating security conditions due to military operations, there has 
been some positive development. Notable scholars in Pakistan have identified growing 
                                                 
220 Major General Tariq Khan, Inspector General, Frontier Corps, Pakistan, interview with Talat 
Hussain on Live with Talat on Aaj TV Network, Pakistan, on April 17, 2009; available from 
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tensions among insurgents and the people of FATA.221 To some it might suggest a 
greater emphasis on military competition. With support from the PAF, the army has made 
significant gains in northern areas of FATA. Considering recent political unrest, the weak 
economy, poor law enforcement and the fear of backlash in settled areas like Swat and 
Buner, the government of Pakistan has exercised restraint. The military's technological 
limitations and resource constraints may contribute to their reluctance to step up kinetic 
applications. 
The U.S. drones are a potent counterterrorism tool. On-board reconnaissance 
sensors, long endurance and all-weather day and night PGMs delivery capability has the 
potential to make up for some of the deficiencies of Pakistan’s airpower. The use of 
drones has mixed effects on public sentiment. The FATA population who are unhappy 
with the Taliban interpretation of Islam and lifestyle favor the attacks. Drone attacks also 
make it difficult for the Taliban to coerce the local population. On the other hand, anti-
U.S. sentiment in FATA is growing as a result of Pashtun nationalism. For different 
reasons, similar sentiments prevail in the settled areas in Pakistan. In addition to opposing 
civilian casualties in FATA, people in settled areas see drone attacks as a violation of 
Pakistan sovereignty. Some consider the attacks directly responsible for the deteriorating 
security situation; some argue that it sets a bad precedent in the region. Increasing 
numbers strongly criticize the government for not doing enough to stop the drone attacks.  
In sum, at present the political cost of the U.S. controlled drone attacks exceeds 
the military benefits to Pakistan’s efforts against militancy. Increasing pressure from the 
U.S. that does not acknowledge constraints on Pakistan's fight against militancy makes it 
difficult for the government of Pakistan to rally popular support against militants. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, COIN is characterized by prolonged, low to medium scale conflict 
in which political competition between rivals takes precedence over military competition. 
A balanced application of kinetic power is critical for COIN. Counterinsurgents must 
demonstrate military superiority over insurgents by winning battles to earn the support of 
the people, who are considered the common center of gravity in the conflict. An 
unnecessarily cautious approach that wastes opportunities to inflict damage on the 
insurgents may send a negative message to the people, while overemphasis on the 
military conflict may lead to collateral damage with potentially serious political 
repercussions. 
Airpower has strong relevance for COIN. The indirect use of airpower for 
transportation, logistics, surveillance and reconnaissance can be a force multiplier for the 
ground forces and optimize the use of the military against the insurgents. In its direct 
application, airpower can accurately deliver considerable firepower on short notice, 
inflicting serious damage. However, if firepower is not well directed due to inadequate 
intelligence or poor decisions, it may cause collateral damage, resulting in substantial 
political losses. The psychological effects of aerial bombing add value to the insurgents' 
propaganda. 
In places like Afghanistan and FATA, cultural factors can make the political 
backlash even more severe. Collateral damage from the inappropriate application of 
direct airpower might swing popular support towards the insurgents, not for ideological 
reasons, but because of badal, the desire for revenge. 
The U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and FATA have entered their 
eighth year. The indirect use of airpower, especially for transportation and logistics, has 
played an important role in sustaining the effort. The direct use of airpower in early 
stages was greatly influenced by the experience of the U.S. in other conflicts where direct 
use of airpower suited the conventional phases of the conflict. When the nature of 
conflict changed from conventional to asymmetric in 2004 and 2005, the COIN failed to 
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adapt the direct use of airpower. The direct use in Afghanistan escalated in 2006 with the 
increased tempo of the insurgency, declining security conditions and mounting military 
pressures on the ground forces. In FATA, sporadic and increasing application of direct 
airpower by Pakistan’s security forces has been observed since 2004 and especially since 
2008. The frequency of U.S. drone attacks has also increased since 2008. Generally 
speaking, the direct use of airpower has been valuable at the tactical level, but with a high 
cost at the strategic level, partially due to civilian casualties from ill-directed kinetic 
applications. 
At the start of the conflict, the Afghan people had strong sentiments against the 
insurgents and in favor of the counterinsurgents. Public opinion now opposes both the 
insurgents and the counterinsurgents, primarily due to bad governance and the heavy-
handed application of military power, especially airpower. In contrast, in FATA, the 
initial sentiments of the local population can be categorized as marginally pro-insurgent, 
with less opposition to the counterinsurgents. These sentiments have now become 
marginally anti-insurgent and anti-counterinsurgent. It appears that insurgents lost 
popular support because of their coercive attitudes, extreme interpretation of Islam and 
disregard for local customs and traditions. In FATA, a major reason for anti-COIN 
sentiment is the external use of airpower, which generates the perception that COIN by 
local forces is being waged on behalf of external forces. 
In Afghanistan, airpower has been often called to salvage bad situations faced by 
ground forces. Poor employment of close air support frequently resulted in collateral 
damage, generating anti-U.S. sentiment among local populations. Notwithstanding these 
adverse effects, it appears that tactically, sustaining COIN operations without airpower 
support has been prohibitively expensive for ground forces. Similarly, in FATA the use 
of airpower by Pakistan and the U.S. has caused significant damage to the insurgents’ 
safe havens and degraded their ability to coerce the local population. At the political 
level, however, increased drone attacks are a major cause of increased anti-U.S. 
sentiment among Pakistan's general population, which makes it politically difficult for 
local forces to generate a sustained COIN effort. 
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Primarily due to collateral damage and its psychological effects, the direct use of 
airpower is increasingly condemned as contributing to deteriorating security in 
Afghanistan, FATA and elsewhere in Pakistan. Some suggest that the use of airpower is 
an important reason the insurgency has escalated. This implies that the use of airpower 
might be reduced if not eliminated completely. Considering modern airpower's capability 
for firepower, accuracy, endurance and the ability to react quickly, it may be unwise to 
stop using it. Efforts should be made to balance its use as a military instrument with 
concern for political support in order to retain the tactical benefits of the direct use of 
airpower and its non-lethal use for transportation, logistics and reconnaissance while 
reducing its political cost. 
Applying the frequently discussed “hammer and anvil”222 approach to a COIN 
setting, airpower is ideally suited to play the role of hammer in support of ground forces 
as long as the ground forces are strong enough to effectively play the role of anvil. If the 
ground forces lack the strength to set up the adversary so airpower can deliver a decisive 
blow, they are likely to get bogged down in a prolonged engagement. Sometimes, as in 
Afghanistan, ground forces will be unable to break contact and have to call on airpower 
for support in a defensive role. Kinetic application by airpower in such situations is likely 
to be counterproductive due to the high chance of collateral damage and consequent 
political backlash. In the last two decades, airpower's improved firepower has prepared 
the battlefield for ground forces in conventional conflicts by softening the adversary 
defenses. In a COIN setting it appears that a role reversal for the two forces has the 
potential to produce better results. Ground forces should be employed to herd the 
insurgents away from the population. This requires support of the local population, sound 
knowledge of local customs and culture, and increased military strength. In a worst case 
scenario, the ground forces should always be in a position to break contact on their own. 
Once the insurgents are physically isolated, airpower’s precision and firepower might 
provide an efficient kill. Such an approach would allow pre-planned application of 
airpower rather than its use to salvage the situation for the ground forces. 
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The recent technological advancements have added weapons’ delivery accuracy 
to the airpower. The COIN setting often requires controlled destruction without 
disturbing the surroundings. Because aerial platforms can only carry so many weapons, 
the payloads available on a given platform frequently exceed the requirements of the 
target. The platform does not have time to return and re-equip with the weapons best 
suited for the target. As a result, airmen frequently put more than the required payloads 
onto a target, resulting in collateral damage. A technological solution to the problem 
would be to divide the warhead of the aerial weapons into many subsections. Each 
section could be equipped with a separate fusing mechanism, with an option in the 
cockpit to arm selective sections in the warhead based on the size and strength of the 
target. This would give the pilot the option of controlled destruction over the target, 
which should significantly reduce collateral damage. 
The theory of COIN reveals that the political competition between insurgents and 
counterinsurgents must have precedence over the military competition. This means that 
the military competition must be planned and executed with the cultural sensitivities of 
the local population in mind. Sometimes a minor military operation can incur significant 
political cost, demonstrated by the U.S. “show of force” missions frequently employed in 
recent months in Afghanistan. These missions are designed to reduce collateral damage 
and achieve military objectives through deterrence rather the actual application of force. 
Given Pashtun culture, however, such missions might have significant political cost. A 
public survey by Afghan journalists or researchers to establish public opinion on the 
passive application of airpower can offer valuable insights on the application of airpower 
for COIN. 
The complexity increases if the COIN forces are a mix of local and external 
forces. The two forces may have different military and economic capabilities, and 
different levels of sensitivity to time and insurgent backlash through terrorist activity. 
This is the case in Afghanistan and FATA. The U.S. led coalition is fighting a “distant 
war.” They have the advantage of technology, but operating in a strange environment, 
they lack HUMINT. As a result, it is often difficult to optimally employ high-tech 
weapons. In contrast, the Pakistani forces in FATA are fighting a “local war.” They have 
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the advantage of HUMINT, but with technological handicaps are unable to verify the 
information. Fearing backlash in the form of terrorist incidents against the domestic 
population and the consequent political cost, the government is often reluctant to employ 
kinetic options. The intensity of the backlash and the political costs both increase 
significantly if collateral damage is caused by external forces. 
Mutual support and cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani counterinsurgent 
forces will benefit both. Verified by electronic means, HUMNINT should improve target 
selection for airpower, hence reducing collateral damage. Making modern weapons with 
improved accuracy available to Pakistan will improve target engagement. Less collateral 
damage should lead to a greater willingness to exercise kinetic options when appropriate. 
The evidence and analysis in this thesis lead to few recommendations.  In 
Afghanistan, to change direct employment of airpower from reactive to proactive, the 
density of ground forces should be increased. Planned levels of increase may not suffice. 
Areas should be identified where ground control can be consolidated. Ground forces 
should be concentrated in these areas first, with controlled expansion in accordance with 
the ink-spot strategy. 
Until the coalition ground forces have the capacity to effectively serve as anvil, 
more emphasis should be placed on the indirect use of airpower. The improved mobility, 
logistics and reach afforded by the indirect use of airpower will optimize the use of 
ground forces. 
Pakistani COIN forces rely heavily on airpower because of fire power 
deficiencies and the mountainous terrain with little communication infrastructure. 
Pakistan’s airpower should be developed for both firepower and information gathering. 
The PAF's ability to deliver PGMs is outdated, especially under current operating 
conditions. The Air Force is also handicapped in terms of surveillance and 
reconnaissance. Improved capacity will help optimize exploitation of available 
opportunities to exercise kinetic options. 
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The use of drone attacks by the U.S. COIN forces over Pakistani territory should 
be stopped. Evidence suggests that the drone attacks have made reasonable tactical gains, 
but at a high political cost primarily because they are being employed by the U.S. The 
tactical benefits can be retained while significantly lowering the political cost if the 
drones are employed by Pakistan’s COIN forces. Therefore, making this technology 
available to Pakistan should be considered. 
The insurgents are not acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, FATA and 
Pakistan. Especially in FATA, people often shelter the insurgents in exchange for money.  
The people should be educated through an information campaign about the dangers of 
collateral damage from airpower when they provide shelter to the insurgents. In the long 
run, however, only economic development and jobs will empower people to stop 
supporting the insurgents. 
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APPENDIX:  ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN SHAPING THE 
INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN 
The history of Afghanistan is full of confrontation between the state and the 
society. The last two and a half centuries shows that the society is more resilient than the 
state. Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali points out that “Afghanistan has a strong nation 
and a weak state.”223 The geopolitical environment is suitable for the state-society 
confrontation, which may be called insurgency from society’s perspective. The Hindu 
Kush range, rugged mountainous terrain with isolated valleys, covers almost half of the 
country’s landmass on the east-west axis. Tribes in these valleys are sensitive to outside 
interference and often resist attempts by the state bureaucracy to control tribal affairs.224  
Various ethnic groups are not free of mutual confrontation. Pashtuns comprise 42 
percent of the population. Most live in the southern and south eastern parts of the country 
and share a common language and culture with people in adjacent areas of Pakistan. The 
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens in central and northern parts of the country are 39 percent 
of the population; they share language, culture and history with the people of the central 
Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. According to Shaista Wahab 
and Barry Youngerman, until recently these tribes had more in common with tribes 
across international borders than with tribes within their own country.225 Ethnic divides 
produce competition within the society; and ethnic commonalities with the tribes of 
adjacent countries make society susceptible to external interference.  
Afghanistan's strategic location has always attracted foreign interventions. In 
ancient times, it was located close to the famous Silk Road. The two superpowers of the 
late 19th and early 20th century, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, competed for 
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influence over a mutually agreed “buffer state.”226 In the effort to contain communist 
expansion in the second half of the 20th century, the U.S. replaced Great Britain. After 
the 9/11 attacks, U.S.-led coalition forces launched a “Global War on Terrorism,” 
invading Afghanistan in October 2001 to destroy its Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
In recent decades, Afghan society witnessed a shift in social structure that affects 
the prevailing insurgency. This annexure analyzes that how the nature of insurgency in 
Afghanistan has evolved. Why has the tribal struggle for power recently become what 
some people call “Islamic radicalism”? What is the role of external players who exploit 
the environment for their vested interests? 
State-society confrontation, intense competition within the society and external 
interference often pose a threat to Afghan social structure. This annexure argues that 
under threat, the society favors the religious faction. When the threat recedes, the society 
swings back to its natural moderate state. The root causes of the social shifts are political, 
not religious or ideological: the desire for peace, justice, security and equal economic 
opportunities. 
This annexure consists of three parts. The first describes traditional Afghan tribal 
society, Afghan social structure, and the delicate state-society relationship. The second 
part briefly covers Afghan history, focusing on competition between internal and external 
forces that polarizes traditional Afghan tribal society and social structure, and the 
society's inherent tendency to return to its natural moderate state and the balance of 
power as the threat recedes. Finally, the annexure analyzes the historical evidence, 
concluding with a possible solution to the problem. 
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A. SOCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON TRIBAL SOCIETY 
 
Afghanistan is a “weak state with a strong society,”227 where society is in a revolt 
against the state.228 Traditional Afghan society gains strength from a tribal culture based 
on consensus and democratic values. In most Afghan tribes, the elders choose the leader, 
called malik, based on ability. He is responsible for political matters and deals with other 
tribes on behalf of his tribe. The tribe respects his word on commitments made to other 
tribes. All decisions are made in tribal jirga, a gathering attended by the elders and the 
heads of the household.229 Therefore, the malik is a representative of his tribe.  
A rich landowner, called khan, controls the economic aspects of the tribe. He 
lends resources to the peasants to cultivate their lands. The khan plays a limited political 
role that depends on his knowledge and personality. 
Islam plays a central role in unifying the tribes. The common people in 
Afghanistan consider religion important for transforming their personal behavior but it 
does not provide an ideology to transform the social structure. Any attack on Islam, 
however, meets negative sentiment.230 The alim, a religious scholar, and the mullah, the 
religious leader who leads prayers in the mosque, both command respect, and they call 
people to fight (jihad) during crisis, but do not play prominent political role. 
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Important reasons for the tribes' evolution into autonomous political units include 
Afghanistan's isolated valleys, frequent foreign interventions, and tribal political, legal, 
economic and to some extent military self sufficiency.231 This makes the state almost 
redundant and is a major reason Afghanistan is characterized as a “weak state” by many 
authors. 
A state requires resources to establish its authority and develop coercive means. 
The Afghan state never possessed sufficient natural resources. The tribes recognize the 
state as a legitimate power, but because it is perceived as redundant, tribes are reluctant to 
support the state financially. Any attempt by the state to extend its control into tribal 
areas for tax collection and other administrative reasons is considered interference and is 
strongly resisted. 
Historically, the lack of resources often tempts the state to accept money from 
external powers. Considering Afghanistan's geographic importance, external powers have 
generally been willing to offer resources, but at a political price. The lending powers 
wanted to control the state's foreign policies. Tribes have been sensitive to foreign 
intervention into internal matters of the state, and revolted against the ruler. This dual 
dilemma facing its rulers has always made Afghanistan difficult to govern. 
Traditional tribal society in Afghanistan is based on the “three pillars” of malik, 
khan and the mullah. Various ethnic tribes combine to form a social structure. Due to 
inherent resistance against external and foreign intervention, intense competitions exist 
between various tribes, as well as between the state and the social structure. The balance 
of power is not rigid, varying from place to place and shifting over time. The challenge 
posed by internal or external threats may also affect the balance of power.  
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B. HISTORY IN AFGHANISTAN 
1. 1747 to 1978 
Afghanistan was a monarchy during its first 225 years. It was ruled by three 
Pashtun tribes: Saddozai, Barakzai, and Musahiban.232  The Saddozai dynasty was 
founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747 and lasted until 1823. He united Afghanistan 
for the first time under native rule. Seventy-five years of Saddozai rule saw six different 
rulers who faced many external and internal conflicts. The external conflicts were mostly 
in the east against the Sikhs and the British rulers of India. The internal conflicts were 
mostly due to intense power struggles within the Saddozai family and sometimes the 
suppression of other tribes. There was little external interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan at first, because nearby states were embroiled in their domestic affairs and 
the Silk Road became less important with substantial increase in maritime trade. Internal 
family power struggles, feuds and defeats in external conflicts led to the decline of 
Saddozai rule. 
The Barakzais ruled Afghanistan from 1823 to 1930, with seven different rulers in 
107 years. The two colonial powers, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, consistently 
competed for political influence over Afghanistan during this period. The Barakzais 
sometimes tried to benefit from both sides by maintaining a balanced relationship with 
both, but found it difficult to please the two competing powers simultaneously. 
Sometimes they also attempted to ally with one power, but the resulting interference into 
internal state affairs invariably annoyed the local tribes. 
The Soviets and the British tried various options. They made bilateral agreements 
to treat Afghanistan as a buffer state. At times they exploited the tribes, giving them 
resources so they would revolt against the state. A few direct invasions to plant dummy 
rulers were also attempted. These proved fairly easy to execute but extremely costly to 
sustain due to tribal resentment and uprisings. A modernization and secularization trend 
in some Muslim countries during the first half of the 20th century also influenced 
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Afghanistan. The last few Barakzai rulers, especially Amanullah, defied tribal culture and 
values in pursuit of modernity and rapid progress. A strong tribal reaction supported by 
covert British support led to the decline of Barakzai rule by 1930.233 
The next 50 years of Afghanistan’s history witnessed moderate shifts in tribal 
society due to ideological confrontations involving communists and Islamists. The 
system continued to be dynastic under Musahiban from 1930 to 1973.234 In 1973, Daoud 
Khan, a member of the Musahiban family, toppled the monarchic system with the help of 
communist forces in Kabul, ruling for five years. In 1978, another communist faction, led 
by Nur Muhammad Taraki, toppled Daoud’s government, holding power until December, 
1979. 
Musahiban rule saw a shift of external interference in Afghanistan's internal 
affairs. British influence was gradually reduced and almost ended after 1947, when 
Britain withdrew from India leaving two independent countries, Pakistan and India. The 
U.S. interest in Afghanistan increased due to concerns about communist expansion. The 
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, however, was halfhearted, probably due to the Korean 
and Vietnam wars. This gave relatively free rein to the Soviets, who first offered 
economic and military assistance, and began ideological intrusion in the late 1950s. 
Urban areas were the main target for communist activities, especially the student 
community of Kabul University. 
Internally, rural areas were relatively peaceful for three main reasons.  First, the 
state reduced interference in internal tribal affairs. Second, the state had stronger police 
and armed forces to coerce people when required. Finally, development projects launched 
by the state provided economic opportunities to the people. An important development in 
the urban areas, instigated by the Soviets, was the establishment of the first political 
party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. Significant political 
differences existed within PDPA, and by the late 1960s it was divided into two hostile 
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factions, Khalq and Parcham.235 Almost concurrently, the Islamists in Kabul University 
also mobilized, mostly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). They 
opposed communists as well as the division of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. They did 
not organize based on tribal structure and were skeptical of traditional Afghan ulema. 
Like the communists, the Islamists were divided in two categories. A moderate group 
wanted progressive reforms through social education. They adopted a traditional Afghan 
approach, saying Islam should guide individual lives, but community problems should be 
solved through Afghan culture.236 The radical group subscribed to a strong interpretation 
of Islam and wanted active military struggle against communists.237 
During the Daoud rule, the confrontations between communists and the Islamists 
were restricted to urban areas, especially Kabul. After the 1978 coup, when the Khalq 
faction of PDPA came to power, repressive communist reforms were launched in rural 
areas as well. According to Andrew Wenger, a concerted effort was made to change the 
basic dynamics of Afghan society by targeting the khans and the maliks. In less than two 
years, 90,000 to 100,000 men disappeared, which increased the power of mullahs and the 
ulema in rural areas. This polarized the society. The modernist and secular element that 
existed since the Barakzai era joined the communists against the young educated 
Islamists allied with ulema and mullahs.238 The confrontation between Islamists and 
communists became intense, and by 1979 the Soviet Union became concerned whether 
the communist regime in Kabul would survive. 
2. Soviet Invasion: 1979 to 1989 
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Like the British, they 
secured a puppet regime in Kabul with deceptive ease. They withdrew from Afghanistan 
in 1989, however, after damaging the country more than any previous invader. Almost 10 
years of repressive occupation affected Afghan society in three ways.  First, probably for 
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the first time, people felt a need to unify warring factions against an invading force. 
Second, the role of religious factions increased.  Finally, the tribes' military skill 
increased. These effects played an important role in shaping insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Afghan society, which always abhorred foreign intervention, received selfish 
support, especially from regional and Muslim countries. The western powers supporting 
Afghanistan wanted to block communist expansion. Regional neighbors exploited the 
situation to promote their vested interests. Saudi Arabia and Iran supported Sunni and 
Shia jihadi groups respectively; Pakistan and India supported Pashtun and Tajik groups 
respectively; all promoted their individual interests. Jihadi volunteers from the Muslim 
world, neither required nor invited by the Afghans, poured into Afghanistan. Mujahidin 
leaders often appealed to the world community for finances and weapons, but manpower 
was never a problem. In fact, at times, because weapons were limited, they had to refuse 
Afghan volunteers the opportunity of jihad.239 Various organizations in the Muslim 
world sponsored volunteers so they could gain military skills for use against regimes 
back home. Ideological differences among Hanfi Afghans and their Wahabi/Salafi Arab 
guests sometimes led to tensions.240 The external selfish support, which resulted in 
disunity among various Afghan groups, also frustrated the people of Afghanistan.241 
Repressive communist reforms and the Soviet invasion caused a shift in 
traditional Afghan social structure. Ulema and mullahs gained a greater role. Given the 
religious nature of Afghan society, their appeal developed quickly, and their calls for 
jihad were effective. However, the ulema did not control the entire resistance campaign. 
Important military decisions were made by the resistance commanders. The maliks 
retained their traditional political role because the ulema and mullahs could not replace 
them.242  
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The ideological shift in support of the religious element during the Soviet 
invasion was limited and temporary. Lack of unity among Mujahidin groups frustrated 
the people. The majority did not support the Arab’s extreme interpretation of Islam. 
Despite grievances, most people continued to support the Mujahidin against the invading 
forces. In 1986, however, when the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, 
the ideological shift weakened and the traditional tribal structure resurfaced.243 
The Soviet invasion was the biggest military challenge that Afghans had faced. 
They gained significant military skills with experience. They began with typical tribal 
frontal attacks. After suffering heavy losses, they switched to hit and run guerrilla tactics 
in the hilly terrain. Soviet convoys moving in narrow valleys were often worthwhile 
targets for ambush. Support from the U.S. and Muslim countries helped them sustain the 
resistance, and by 1986 some authors argued that the Soviets might not be able to defeat 
the Mujahidin militarily.244 The Soviets had to increase their initial strength of 50,000 to 
about 115,000.245 They learned that it is difficult to control Afghanistan while sitting in 
Kabul. Notwithstanding the importance of controlling Kabul, it is not sufficient to control 
the tribes in the countryside.246 
3. Internal Struggle: 1989 to 2001 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the next 12 years 
witnessed an intense power struggle between the Najibullah regime and the Mujahidin, 
and also within various factions of Mujahidin. The Mujahidin lacked unity. The regional 
players, apparently working to promote consensus among Mujahidin leaders, sensed 
opportunities to expand their influence in the future Afghan government. Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan supported Sunni groups, with the latter biased towards Gulbadin 
Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami (HIG).  Iran supported Shia groups and India opted for 
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Najibullah, probably to please the Soviets.247 Encouraged by external powers, the 
Mujahidin attempted to install a parallel government to gain legitimacy. They failed due 
to poor planning, lack of commitment and disunity.248 
In rural areas, the confrontation among local Mujahidin leaders resulted in great 
suffering for the people. However, Najibullah sustained power in Kabul with plenty of 
military equipment from the withdrawing Soviet forces and generous financial help from 
the Soviet Union. With the decreasing popularity of Mujahidin, he hired manpower to 
organize an Afghan army, and had sufficient money to buy the loyalty of some Mujahidin 
leaders. Finally, the financial support of the already-divided Mujahidin started to 
decline.249 The people saw light at the end of the tunnel when Najibullah resigned in 
March, 1992 probably on the advice of Russian president Boris Yeltsin.250  
With the opportunity to form a government in Afghanistan, the Mujahidin leaders 
led the people of Afghanistan to greater suffering. All the leaders rushed towards Kabul 
with their militias, hoping to grab maximum power in the new regime. Kabul became a 
battlefield. After pushing Hikmatyar, leader of Hizb-e-Islami and a Pashtun 
fundamentalist, south, Ahmed Shah Masoud, a Tajik military leader supported by some 
other leaders, managed to hold the largest area.  Although nominated as prime minister 
for the coalition government, Hikmatyar demanded a greater role in the government and 
bombed the city for about two years, killing around 50,000 civilians, wounding another 
100,000 and destroying about 70 percent of the city infrastructure.251 Food shortages led 
to severe crises. Most small cities and rural areas were grabbed by the local warlords, 
who were brutal and changed allegiances frequently.252 Having lost all hope, people were 
ready to accept anyone who could restore peace and security.253 
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The scene was set for the Taliban254 when they entered southern Afghanistan in 
September 1994.255 The Taliban movement, led by Mullah Muhammad Omer Mujahid, a 
Durrani Pashtun, arose from local feuds. Overwhelming support from the people in 
Pashtun-dominated areas helped them to gain control of southern Afghanistan easily, 
including Kandhar, Jalalabad, Herat and Kabul.256 They faced resistance in the north 
from the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Shah Masoud (a Tajik), Abdul Rashid Dostum (an 
Uzbik), Hizb-i-Wahadat (Shia fundamentalists) and the Shia Hazara groups. Taliban got 
weapons came from the common people and the groups they had fought. The advanced 
military skills they displayed in some larger battles lead some to believe they were 
actively supported by Pakistan.257 
The people of Afghanistan got peace, security and justice, but at a significant cost.  
Strict Shia rule was enforced. Men were instructed to grow beards. Women were not 
allowed to work outside their homes. Education for girls was forbidden until separate 
schools were established. The Taliban, including their leadership, were all common 
people, without the knowledge to manage a government.258 They maintained peace with 
the help of religious police, but the economy, especially in larger cities, suffered badly. 
Externally, the Taliban were recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Iran supported the Northern Alliance because the Taliban had anti-Shia policies. India, 
simply because of Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban, also supported the Northern 
Alliance. Initially supportive of the Taliban, the U.S. turned against them because of their 
strong gender discrimination and extreme interpretation of Islam.259 A few Taliban 
attempts to claim their United Nations seat were declined. 
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The Taliban’s foreign policy, especially with regards to terrorism, compounded 
their difficulties. In May 1999, they allowed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
to set up a terrorist training camp in the north, which annoyed Russia and China. In 1996, 
Osama bin Ladin was given refuge in Afghanistan to set up Al-Qaeda’s headquarters in 
Khost, a base camp built by Bin-Ladin in 1987. Besides refusing a Saudi extradition 
demand in November 1999, Afghanistan also declined a UN Security Council extradition 
demand.260 
Broadly speaking, people accepted the Taliban because they wanted peace and 
justice, and not because of the group's religious appeals. Dominated by Sunni Muslims, 
the Taliban movement targeted Shia Muslims for political reasons.  Mostly Pashtun, it 
continued to fight with other ethnicities. This polarized the social structure on religious as 
well as ethnic grounds. The Taliban’s interpretation of Islam and radical policies shifted 
the balance of power in tribal society extensively in favor of the mullahs. Considering 
their low popularity among the people of Afghanistan, evident from public celebrations 
when they were overthrown in December 2001, it appears that the shift in favor of the 
mullahs would not have lasted long. 
4. War on Terror: 2001 to Present 
The U.S. started aerial bombing on October 7, 2001, less than a month after 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  The Northern Alliance’s ground forces supported 
by U.S. airpower easily defeated the Taliban in little over two months.261 The Northern 
Alliance brutally killed any foreign fighters among the Taliban. The attitude towards 
local Taliban, however, was relatively mild, and especially in the south, where the forces 
of Hamid Karzai, later the president of Afghanistan, negotiated their way into 
Kandahar.262 Many local Taliban were allowed to go home after surrendering their 
weapons. Many Taliban escaped into adjacent Baluchistan and Pakistan's Federally 
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Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The U.S. and Afghan forces continued to target Al-
Qaeda and Taliban fighters hiding in eastern hilly areas. In May 2003, the U.S. 
announced an end to major operations in Afghanistan.263 
The people of Afghanistan were happy to see the backs of the repressive Taliban 
rulers.264 Fed up with prolonged fighting and destruction, the people broke with tradition 
and reconciled with the foreign forces.265 Despite early chaos and looting in larger cities, 
people had high hopes for security, justice, jobs and return to normal life. Occasional 
insurgent activity and sporadic tribal feuds continued, but by the end of 2003 it appeared 
that the insurgency had died down. An upsurge was witnessed in mid 2006, which swiftly 
became an organized insurgency, mainly in Pashtun areas in the south and southeast, the 
stronghold of the Taliban.266  
In addition to Al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters, the Taliban are supported by the 
Haqqani network and Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. Jalal-ud-din Haqqani, the 
leader of Haqqani network, and Hikmatyar are known for their extreme interpretation of 
Islam. Their alliance with the Taliban, however, appears to be against a common external 
enemy, rather than based on a common ideology. In fact, Taliban and Hikmatyar were 
fierce enemies in the past. The resurgence of insurgency reflects the evolution of Afghan 
society over the last few years. 
The deepened ethnic divisions in Afghan society make it internally unstable and 
also increase the complexity of the state-to-society relationship. The interactions among 
the various ethnicities have become more complex. They tend to unite against a common 
external enemy, but fight among themselves when the threat fades away. The majority of 
Afghans, while moderate Muslims, react violently to practices that are perceived as un-
Islamic. The increased political role of mullahs during Soviet war was strengthened 
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during the Taliban era. The Taliban once again seem to be exploiting popular religious 
sentiments, especially in Pashtun dominated areas, to gain support against an external 
enemy.267 
Good governance is the key to counterinsurgency (COIN). One reasons for 
Karzai’s weak governance is his inability to curb local strongmen and their militias.  In 
fact, in some provinces he was blackmailed to hand over the powers to the warlords.268 
According to a recently published CRS, report Karzai calls the warlords “a major threat 
to Afghan stability.”269 Some of the warlords nominated to be provincial governors 
collect taxes and instead of depositing them to the central government, use the money for 
raising personal militias.270 Their favoritism to their own tribes upset other regional 
tribes, leading to local feuds. Sometimes the warlords even misdirect security forces, 
inaccurately labeling rival tribes as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.271 In some areas the warlords 
have been helped by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).272 In southern and eastern 
areas, the U.S. co-opted some warlords to pursue counterterrorism goals.273 
Because the Afghan National Police (ANP) is corrupt and the government is 
unable to provide security,274 people started to recall the relatively peaceful period of 
Taliban rule, which gave the Taliban a window of opportunity.275 One reason people 
accept the Taliban is their appreciable flexibility compared with their earlier extreme 
interpretation of Islam.276 In many areas where government was unable to provide 
security, people had no choice but to support the Taliban. In addition to providing 
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security, however, the Taliban disrupted development projects, humanitarian works by 
various NGOs and other local economic activities, creating difficulties for the 
government.277 
The security forces adopted "heavy handed tactics”278 to curb Taliban activities, 
which proved counterproductive. Generous use of airpower led to collateral damage, 
sometimes involving civilian causalities of women and children. Thomas Johnson 
observes that in routine house to house searches for terrorists and weapons, U.S. security 
troops were rude and did not respect local customs and culture in dealing with women. 
This increased the hatred of foreign troops in a society historically wary of foreign 
occupation. Inadequate numbers of security troops forced the government to deploy 
Afghan troops from other ethnicities into the Pashtun areas, increasing Pashtun 
resentment.279 
Resources in Afghanistan were stretched significantly due to the Iraq war in 2003. 
Available resources were not optimally utilized by the weak, corrupt Afghan 
government.280 With reduced levels of international commitment and the poor state of the 
Afghan government, the people started to fear regime change.281 They hesitate to offer 
complete support to the government, fearing punishment if the Taliban return to power. 
Part of the problem is that the apparent U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are vague 
and contradictory. According to Johnson, the stated U.S. goal in Afghanistan is “to create 
a stable democracy which would never again harbor international terrorists.”282 In 
contrast, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the head of the Danish Institute of Military Studies, 
believes that the early U.S. ambitions were “to get rid of Taliban and to kill as many 
terrorists involved in 9-11 as possible.”283 The notion of democracy came later, involving 
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development work for nation-building. Agreeing with Rasmussen, Jalali notes that as a 
result, the initial “level of investment in reconstructing Afghanistan was determined not 
by the actual needs of the country, but rather was shaped by the requirements of military 
operations.”284 For several years, the Pentagon treated the situation as “counterterrorism” 
rather than counterinsurgency.285 
C. ANALYSIS 
The insurgency in Afghanistan emerges from the competitive nature of tribal 
society. There is a competition for power within as well as between tribes, and the society 
also resists the state interference. The society is not willing to support the state, nor does 
it allow the state to accept support from external sources. Tribes often unite to resist 
external intervention, while at the same time taking advantage of any opportunity to use 
external power against competing tribes. 
When threatened, the balance of power in the Afghan tribal society triangle of the 
malik, khan and mullah shifts in favor of mullah. Three observations are made in this 
regard: 
First, the extent of shift seems to have a direct relation to the gravity of the threat 
and the level of desperation among the people. Prior to 1979, the shifts were mild and of 
short duration. During the Soviet invasion, the shift was more extreme and persisted for a 
longer time. In 1996 it appeared strong due to the people's increased desperation. 
Second, the shift may not be permanent, as demonstrated in the post Soviet 
period, when Gulbadin Hikmatyar, a strong fundamentalist, formed a coalition with 
Shahnawaz Tanai, a strong communist supporter; their only common ground was their 
shared Pushtun ethnicity. Mass jubilation in urban centers after the defeat of the Taliban 
also supports this observation.  
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Last, the shift is not entirely due to religious motivation. It often results from the 
desire of peace, security and justice. The start of the Taliban movement in 1996 is a case 
in point. Most Afghans, as moderate Muslims, would not support extreme interpretations 
of Islam. In 1996, Pashtun Afghans supported the Taliban because local people were tired 
of prolonged fighting between various Mujahidin factions. In the south, the Taliban’s 
ability to restore order motivated people to support them. 
In 1996, the Taliban rose to power not because of their leadership qualities, or 
because of their ability to govern or their religious appeal to the people, but because most 
people were desperate for peace and security. They had lost faith in other leaders. The 
power of mullahs increased only in the Taliban dominated Pashtun tribes, and was 
maintained by repressive rule. Considering the internal strength of Afghan tribal society, 
it seems likely that with time, a counter trend would have emerged. 
In post 2001 period, it appeared that Afghan society will revert to its traditional 
balance of power. Seeking peace and security, people were willing to accept the idea of 
foreign intervention. Poor governance and predatory warlords have thwarted the hope for 
peace, allowing the Taliban to resurface. In 2006, the coalition forces’ heavy handed 
policy and collateral damage caused by inappropriate use of airpower further opened a 
window of opportunity for the Taliban. Hence, a shift in favor of an internal threat, 
perceived as smaller, has emerged against the external threat, perceived as more serious. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Due to decades of war and internal and external threats, the balance of power in 
Afghan tribal society has shifted in favor of the religious element. Whenever such threats 
recede, the society shows signs of normalization.  The failure of successive regimes is 
pushing the society toward religious factions yet again. Insurgent groups, including 
Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami, Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda seem to be gaining momentum.  
In the last few decades, Afghanistan experienced military, political, ideological 
and religious intervention and interference.  The Soviet Union and the U.S. invaded 
militarily for ideological and political reasons. India and Pakistan competed for political 
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influence; Iran and Saudi Arabia interfered to promote their own brand of religion. Al-
Qaeda tried to exploit religious sentiments in order to pursue their agenda of global jihad.  
It appears that peace will return to Afghanistan only after internal forces are 
allowed to compete and confront one another. For this to happen, external intervention 
and interference must cease. As internal forces compete or confront each other, external 
forces must not provide material support to exploit them. Humanitarian support for 
reconstruction should continue; any external presence required for such support should 
come from a moderate Muslim country. The level of expected peace must be based on 
Afghan standards (perhaps a situation similar to the late 1960s to early 1970s). An 
idealistic approach calling for peace to be perfect and fast is likely to prove 
counterproductive.  
Because the Afghans are moderate Muslims, they will most likely support the 
efforts of maliks to win power back from mullahs. There is good chance that the society 
will reject extreme interpretation of Islam, as it did in 2001. The Northern Alliance’s 
violent behavior against foreign fighters, the strained relations between Taliban and 
Arabs during the surrender of Kandahar in 2001 and the common people's hatred of Arab 
fighters are all evidence supporting the strong possibility that global jihadi groups will be 
rejected by the society. 
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